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I. INTRODUCTION
Becky Bell was only seventeen years old when she died in 1988 as a
result of complications from an illegal abortion.1 Her parents, Bill
and Karen Bell, blame her death on an Indiana state law, which re-
quires that minors get parental consent or, in the alternative, receive
permission from a judge prior to obtaining an abortion.2 After Becky
died, the Bells pieced together the frightened decisions and tragic
events that led to their daughter's death. They learned from Becky's
friends that she had become pregnant some three to four months
before seeking the abortion.3 The father of Becky's child was a
young man Becky had been seeing for a short while who was unwill-
ing to help Becky out of her predicament. 4 Becky decided to visit the
Planned Parenthood office in Indianapolis where she was informed
that her options were either to seek consent to have an abortion from
one of her parents; apply to a juvenile court judge for a waiver from
the consent requirements of the state law; or travel to Kentucky, the
closest state where no parental consent was required, and obtain an
abortion.5 Apparently, none of these choices seemed feasible to the
young, frightened girl. Instead, she sought and obtained an illegal
abortion. Five days later she was dead.6 The coroner determined the
cause of death to be "infections stemming from a 'septic abortion.' "7
Before their daughter's death, the Bells were unaware that Indiana
had a parental consent law.8 They candidly admit that prior to the
tragedy, they probably would have approved of the law and sided
1. Carlson, Abortion's Hardest Cases, TIME, July 9, 1990, at 22.
2. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-25(a)-(c) (Burns Supp. 1988).
3. Hewitt, Freeman, Nelson & Shaw, Mortal Choices at a Tender Age, PEOPLE,
July 23, 1990, at 34.
4. Id.
5. Id. See infra note 182 (explaining that Kentucky's parental consent law was
not enforced in 1988).
6. Id.
7. L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at El, col. 6. The doctor attending Becky when she
died said that she was the victim of blood poisoning, the result of a dirty instrument
inserted in her vagina to effect the abortion. Hewitt, Freeman, Nelson & Shaw, supra
note 3, at 34.
8. Hewitt, Freeman, Nelson & Shaw, supra note 3, at 34.
with prolife advocates who claim that such laws promote family com-
munication.9 Today, however, they actively participate as spokespe-
ople in a new campaign by prochoice advocates to convince voters
that allowing a teenager to have an abortion without notifying her
parents should be legal.10
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,"l the Supreme Court upheld the most re-
strictive parental notification statute then existing in the United
States.12 That statute requires notice to both parents or compliance
with a judicial bypass procedure before a minor may obtain an abor-
tion within the State of Minnesota.13
The Supreme Court decision, however, did not settle the political
controversy over minors' rights to abortions. In fact, the debate goes
much deeper and centers at the heart of the abortion issue. Prolife
advocates hail the Court's ruling as a victory for the unborn child and
the family unit,14 but prochoice advocates see the decision as another
obstacle, legislatively placed by the states and judicially upheld by
the Supreme Court, in the path of women seeking to exercise their
right to have an abortion.15 Currently, this right is guarded by the
protections granted women in the Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade16 deci-
sion, but those protections are continually waning as more and more
state regulations of abortion are upheld.
This Note will critique the Court's decision in Hodgson regarding
parental notification statutes and will discuss the history and evolv-
ing status of permissible state regulation of the abortion decision.
Part II traces the history of the major abortion cases decided by the
Supreme Court with specific focus upon parental notification and
consent decisions. Part III analyzes the majority, concurring and dis-
9. Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1990, at A3.
10. Id.
11. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
12. It was considered by the Supreme Court to be the most restrictive notice stat-
ute because it requires notice to both parents, whether or not they reside in the same
household and regardless of whether they are divorced or separated. Id. at 2931 n.5.
The Court upheld two main portions of the statute, including the portion which re-
quires notification to both parents and the portion which provides an alternative judi-
cial bypass procedure whereby a minor, who is either mature or for whom notification
will not serve her best interests, can avoid notification. Additionally, the Court upheld
the forty-eight hour waiting period contained in the statute, Which commences upon
notification of the minor's parents. For a full discussion of the case, see infra notes
204-319 and accompanying text.
13. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West Supp. 1989). For the text of the statute,
see infra note 185.
14. See Comment, The Viability of Parental Abortion Notification and Consent
Statutes: Assessing Fact and Fiction, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 881, 887 (1989) (noting that the
Court deems a state's interest in promoting parental authority as legitimate and favors
the "traditional parental role of child rearing").
15. See Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe decision drastically limited the ability of the
states to regulate women's abortion decisions.
[Vol. 18: 955, 1991] Hodgson v. Minnesota
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
senting opinions in the Hodgson decision. The judicial, legislative and
social impacts flowing from Hodgson are considered in Part IV. Part
V concludes with a look at the present state of permissible abortion
regulation as sanctioned by the Court. Finally, any pending cases
before the Court which might impact the future extent of permissi-
ble state regulation are discussed.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. State Regulation Before Roe
Abortion was a fairly accepted and common practice during the
colonization and unionization of the United States.17 In fact, state
regulation of abortion by statute in this country was nonexistent un-
til the nineteenth century.18 Even then, the statutes promulgated by
the various states were not enacted for religious or moral reasons;
rather, their main purpose was to protect women's health.19 Physi-
cians of the time, who recognized that many abortions performed
during that period were unsafe,20 were the leading force behind a
movement to criminalize abortions.21 Partly to gain sentiment in
their favor and partly because of their increased scientific under-
standing of fetal development, 22 the physicians focused on the fetus's
right to life in their public campaign.23 It was this focus which
helped change the public attitude toward abortion and led to the
17. L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 28 (1990). The American juris-
dictions were governed by the common law, which permitted abortion "until 'quicken-
ing,' the time when the first movement of the fetus was perceived by the woman." Id.
The result was that abortion was commonly practiced through the fourth or fifth
month of pregnancy. Id. While postquickening abortion was considered a crime, it was
usually only a misdemeanor offense. Id.
18. J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
PoLIcy, 1800-1900 3-4 (1978). The first abortion regulation in the United States was en-
acted by the state of Connecticut in 1821. Id. at 20. Connecticut's statute prohibited
the inducement of abortion through dangerous poisons. Id. at 21.
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 29.
20. For example, administering a dose of poison, hopefully sufficient to kill the fe-
tus but not the pregnant woman, was a popular abortion method which physicians of
the time hoped to curb. Id Additionally, statistics from the period show that the mor-
tality rate from surgically-performed abortions was much higher than the mortality
rate incident to childbirth, the result of postprocedure infections. I& Another prob-
lem was the wide variety of dangerous "home remedies" which were commercially
available, ranging from strenuous exercise programs to products which were physically
inserted into the uterus. Id
21. J. MOHR, supra note 18, at 34.
22. The scientific community had recognized that human development was a con-
tinuing process, rather than a sudden event which occurred at "quickening." Id. at 165.
23. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 30.
modern moral debate over the procedure. 24
The physicians were ultimately successful in their campaign, and,
in over forty states, abortion procedures were legislatively declared
illegal except when such procedures were necessary to protect the
life of the woman involved.25 However, these statutes were largely
unenforced,26 and medical practitioners often defined "therapeuti-
cally necessary" 27 abortions loosely28 in order to accommodate their
patients' desires.
During the 1960s and 1970s, two new factors played upon the view
held by the medical community about the proper regulation of abor-
tion. Specifically, ingestion of the tranquilizer thalidomide and an
outbreak of the German Measles among pregnant women resulted in
widespread birth defects 29 Patients desperately sought the approval
of their physicians to undergo abortions. Resistance by the courts in
terming these requested abortions "medically necessary" led physi-
cians to challenge the same criminal abortion laws their predecessors
had sought to establish.3o
In support of the emerging view within the medical community,
the American Medical Association issued a statement in 1967 which
expressly favored liberalization of abortion regulation among the
states.31 This was followed in 1970 by a statement recognizing the le-
gitimacy of the abortion procedure, limited only by the "[s]ound
clinical judgment" of a woman's best interests by her physician.32
The American public expressed support of this viewpoint, as evi-
denced by their response to a Gallup poll taken during the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 34. Additionally, the distinction between "quick" and "non-quick" fe-
tuses was abandoned. J. MOHR, supra note 18, at 35.
26. In fact, illegal abortions were the norm. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 35.
27. Traditionally, an abortion was considered "therapeutic" when it was induced
to save the life of the mother. SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE A-18
(1990). In modem times, the term includes abortions induced to preserve the health of
the mother as well. Id.
28. For example, during the first half of the twentieth century, doctors were
known to perform "therapeutic" abortions for poverty or psychiatric reasons, both of
which questionably threaten a woman's life. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 35.
29. A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law oti Abortion: The Contradic-
tions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 178 (1972). "During the 1960s,
thalidomide was prescribed and ingested by pregnant women in both Europe and the
United States. The drug was later discovered to cause severe fetal abnormalities." Id.
at 178 n.11. Additionally, German Measles, otherwise known as rubella, was an epi-
demic during the 1960s. Id. at 178. It was estimated that 30,000 abnormal children
were born to women who had been afflicted with German Measles during pregnancy.
Id. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 37.
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 37.
31. R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 124 (1984).
32. Id.
[Vol. 18: 955, 1991] Hodgson v. Minnesota
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
thalidomide episode of the 1960s.33
Legislative reforms followed upon the heels of these two tragic
medical episodes. Starting in 1967, states began considering revisions
to their penal codes, and by 1970, twelve states had implemented re-
forms.34 Most states based their reforms upon the American Law In-
stitute's 1962 suggested model abortion provisions, which would allow
abortions in three situations: (1) when continuation of the pregnancy
would seriously impair the mental or physical health of the mother;
(2) when the child was likely to be born with serious mental or phys-
ical defects; and (3) when the pregnancy was the result of rape or in-
cest.35 While these, revisions appeared to be a far cry from the
previous stance of the states, which generally criminalized abortion
except when the life of the mother was at stake, the result of the
new laws was not always beneficial. In fact, statistics showed that
fewer women were successful in obtaining abortions after the re-
forms than before they were enacted.36 This result appeared to occur
because of the bureaucratic nature of the new laws, which required
women to wade through extremely burdensome regulations, such as
seeking the approval of hospital review boards before obtaining an
abortion, or proving certain facts to the state solicitor general in cases
of rape.37 The net effect was that almost all abortions were prohib-
33. F. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 27 (1989) (noting that a poll taken shortly after one woman's well-publi-
cized abortion following thalidomide ingestion indicated that 52% of Americans sup-
ported the abortion, and only 32% were opposed to it).
34. E. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS AND THE COURTS 23 (2d ed. 1987).
35. Graham, The Law: Review of Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1967, at Ell.
36. For example, following reform in Colorado, 19 out of 20 women seeking legal
abortions were turned away. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1969, at 1. Likewise, following a
change in California's laws, it was found that while 2,035 legal abortions were per-
formed in 1968, 100,000 illegal abortions occurred. Monroe, How California's Abortion
Law Isn't Working, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 29, 1968, at 10.
37. Georgia, for example, enacted a statute which provided, in pertinent part:
(3)(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed under this section un-
less each of the following conditions is met:
(3) Such physician's judgment is reduced to writing and concurred in by at
least two other physicians ... who certify in writing based upon their separate
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman, the abortion is, in
their judgment, necessary ....
(6) If the proposed abortion is considered necessary because the woman has
been raped, the woman makes a written statement under oath, subject to the
penalties of false swearing, of the date, time and place of the rape and the
name of the rapist, if known. There must be attached to this statement a cer-
tified copy of any report of the rape made by any law enforcement officer or
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the judicial circuit where
the rape occurred or allegedly occurred that, according to his best informa-
tion, there is probable cause to believe that the rape did occur.
ited, though no, longer criminalized.3 8
The negative effects upon women resulting from the promulgation
of these new abortion laws gave rise to a new challenge, supported by
women's organizations,39 to repeal criminal abortion statutes alto-
gether.40 By 1973, the year of the landmark Roe v. Wade decision,
four states had already repealed their abortion laws and "guaranteed
a woman by law the right to choose for herself whether to terminate
her pregnancy." 41 Nineteen other states, choosing to follow the
aforementioned reform movement rather than outright repeal, had
decriminalized abortion only in certain situations.42
B. The Development of the Right of Privacy
The individual right of privacy, although not found expressly in the
Constitution, has been legitimized by the Supreme Court.43 This pri-
vacy doctrine was first announced twenty-six years ago in Griswold v.
Connecticut.44 There, the Court struck down statutes prohibiting the
use and distribution of contraceptive devices.45 Additionally, the
Court articulated that a right of privacy could be discerned in the
"penumbras" 46 of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 202 (1973) (Appendix A to the Court's opinion) (setting out
the Georgia criminal statute at issue).
38. See id. at 202-05.
39. Until the movement for total repeal of abortion, women's organizations had
virtually avoided participation in the abortion issue. E. RUBIN, supra note 34, at 23.
However, in 1967, the newly formed National Organization for Women (NOW) in-
cluded the "Right of Women to Control their Reproductive Lives" in their Women's
"Bill of Rights." Id.
40. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 43. In 1969, the National Association for the Repeal
of Abortion Laws (NARAL) was formed. L. LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE
REVOLUTION 88-97 (1973). The NARAL eventually became a prominent lobbying
group for prochoice viewpoints. Id.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973). The four states were Alaska, Ha-
waii, New York and Washington. Id
42. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 32 (1987).
43. The concept of a right of privacy probably originated in an article written by
Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). In that article, the writers advocated that all per-
sons possess an "inviolate personality" which deserves protection. Id. at 211. The right
to privacy concept subsequently evolved in cases decided by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing parents' liberty interest in ed-
ucating their children in languages other than English); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (validating parents' freedom of choice in sending their children to pri-
vate, rather than public, schools); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking
down a mandatory sterilization statute for criminals who had committed crimes of
moral turpitude and establishing that rights related to marriage and procreation are
fundamental).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Id. at 485-86.
46. The term "penumbra" here means at the periphery or fringe of the specific
Bill of Rights provisions listed. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 919 (2d Col-
lege ed. 1982).
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ments.47 This right was recognized by the Court to be inherent in
the marital relationship and included the right to decide what to do
within the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms .... ,'48
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,49 the Court expressly ex-
tended this right of privacy regarding the distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons5 0 as well. Eliminating any doubts that
Griswold applied to married persons only, the Court elaborated that
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child."51
The decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt, which delineated the
constitutionally protected right of privacy, were the crucial progeni-
tors to the development of abortion regulation in the Supreme Court.
Indeed, it was the year following Eisenstadt, in the controversial Roe
v. Wade opinion, when the Court determined that the privacy doc-
trine was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." 52
C. The Modern Abortion Cases
The progeny of modern abortion cases developed out of the Roe v.
Wade decision which legalized abortion nationwide.53 In Roe, the
Supreme Court was faced with striking a difficult compromise be-
tween prolife advocates who claimed that "human life deserves pro-
tection from the moment of conception," and prochoice advocates
who claimed that the choice should be the pregnant woman's until
47. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
48. Id. at 485. Perhaps the most famous quote from the Griswold opinion lies in
this statement: "Would we allow the police to search the. sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" Id.
49. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
50. Id. at 454.
51. Id. at 453.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The outer limits of this privacy doctrine appear to have
been defined in the Supreme Court case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
There, the Court determined that a state could criminalize homosexual sodomy with-
out violating the right to privacy. Id. at 189. The Court specifically refused to elevate
the act of homosexual sodomy to a fundamental right. Id. at 195-96. The court rea-
soned that homosexual sodomy, in contrast to marriage, procreation, and child rearing,
was not one of the traditional values which the framers of the Bill of Rights intended
to protect. Id. at 192-94.
53. The Texas statute at issue there made it a crime to procure or attempt an
abortion, unless necessary to save the life of the mother. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18
n.1.
childbirth.54 However, in a seven-two decision,5 5 the Court strategi-
cally avoided the moral and religious issues and based its ruling on a
woman's constitutional right to privacy.56 The Roe majority recog-
nized this right to privacy as a fundamental right.57 Thus, after Roe,
states have been allowed to interfere with a woman's abortion deci-
sion only if they have a "compelling reason" for doing so. 58
The Court used a trimester approach in its analysis.59 In the first
trimester of a woman's pregnancy, her decision to have an abortion is
completely private and protected from state interference; however,
the state can require that the procedure be performed by a licensed
physician.o In the second trimester, the state's interest in the wo-
man's health becomes compelling, and the state is thereby granted
the limited authority to regulate abortions only when the woman's
health is at stake.6 ' Otherwise, the woman's decision to have an
abortion is still protected by her right of privacy.62 At approximately
the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy, the fetus becomes
viable and is capable of surviving outside the mother's womb, making
the state's interest in protecting the potential for life compelling.63
The state is then permitted to regulate the woman's abortion decision
even to the point of prohibition, in order to protect a fetus's life, un-
less the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
woman. 64
54. W. SCHWARTZ, THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME
COURT, 1969-1986 115 (1987).
55. The majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell. Addi-
tionally, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart filed separate con-
curring opinions. A dissenting opinion was written by Justice White and joined by
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. For a discussion of the right of privacy, see supra notes
43-52 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. The most often recognized fun-
damental rights are: the right to freedom of association (see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)); the right to vote (see Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)); the right to interstate travel (see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969)); and the right to privacy, including freedom of
choice in marital, child bearing, and child rearing decisions (see supra notes 43-52 and
accompanying text).
58. Fundamental rights are reviewed under a "strict scrutiny" standard. J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 418-19 (2d ed.
1983). Basically, if a law restricts fundamental rights, the Court has raised the stan-
dard that the law must meet in order to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 418. The
strict scrutiny standard requires that the legislation be "necessary to promote a com-
pelling or overriding interest of government," or it will be struck down as "violative of
the due process clause." Id. at 418-19.
59. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
60. Id. at 163-65.
61. Id. at 163-64.
62, Id.
63, Id. at 163.
64. Id. at 163-65. It is interesting to note that the point of viability is dependent
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Since Roe, the Court has attempted to define the parameters placed
upon state power to regulate abortion. The cases it has considered
generally center around three separate issues: (1) whether states can
restrict the types of abortion procedures which may be utilized; (2)
whether the pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion can be
limited by a third person's consent; and (3) whether public funding
must be provided for abortions. Each category of the cases will be
considered in turn.
1. The Abortion Procedure Cases
In efforts to restrict the number of abortions performed within
their boundaries, some states, subsequent to the Roe decision, enacted
regulations which limited the types of abortions that could be per-
formed, or the procedures that could be used pursuant to the per-
formance of those abortions. For example, Missouri enacted a law
which required physicians to utilize the prostaglandin method65 of
abortion, rather than the much more common saline amniocentesis
method,66 after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 67 Missouri as-
serted that the purpose of the law was to protect maternal health.68
However, in Planned Parenthood v. Daforth,69 the Court noted
that the Missouri law actually resulted in the use of abortion tech-
niques which were more dangerous than the outlawed saline amni-
upon the changing state of medical technology, which will presumedly continue to
move that point forward into earlier stages of pregnancy. See Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For exam-
ple, at the time Roe was decided, the state of medical technology placed viability at
about twenty-eight weeks gestation; however, present day technology places viability
at about twenty-four weeks. Id. at 457; L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 21-22. Hence, as Jus-
tice O'Connor has noted, "[t]he Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with
itself." Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The point to be inferred is
that, as technology pushes the point of viability forward into the second, and possibly,
someday, the first trimester of pregnancy, state regulation of abortion to protect the
life of the fetus will technically be permitted at a time when it was historically prohib-
ited under the framework set out in Roe.
65. With the prostaglandin method, the hormone prostaglandin is injected into the
woman's womb to effect the abortion. S. TERKEL, ABORTION: FACING THE ISSUES 52
(1988).
66. "Saline amniocentesis" is a process "whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn
and 'a saline or other fluid' is inserted into the amniotic sac" in order to cause prema-
ture labor and an expulsion of the fetus. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
76 (1976). Sixty-eight to eighty percent of all abortions performed in the United States
utilize this procedure. Id. at 77.
67. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 75-76.
68. Id. at 76.
69. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
ocentesis method and found that the saline method was actually safer
for pregnant women than carrying their children to term and under-
going childbirth.70 Furthermore, since the riskier prostaglandin
method was not yet available within Missouri,71 the Court held that
the law was plainly a regulation designed to prevent abortions, rather
than to protect maternal health.72
Next, the Court considered an Ohio regulation which mandated
that all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospi-
tal.73 In Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health,74 the
Court concluded that the regulation, which had the effect of barring
abortions in licensed clinics, unconstitutionally violated the abortion
right established in Roe.75 While conceding that the state's interest
in protecting the woman's health becomes compelling during the sec-
ond trimester, the Court held that Ohio's regulation was not "reason-
ably designed to further" that interest.7 6 The Court pointed out that
abortions are substantially more expensive in hospitals than clinics 77
and that at least one type of abortion procedure could be performed
safely in a suitably-equipped clinic.78 Hence, since the statute pre-
vented some economically disadvantaged women from obtaining
abortions, the Ohio regulation was struck down as an unreasonable
means of achieving the state's interest in protecting the woman's
health.79
In contrast, on the same day Akron was decided, the Court upheld
in Simopoulos v. Virginia8 o a Virginia statute which allowed second
trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital or outpatient clinic
only if the facility was licensed as a "hospital" by the state.8 1 The
Court upheld the statute's constitutionality and affirmed the convic-
tion of a Virginia physician who had performed a second trimester
70. Id. at 76-78.
71. Id at 77 n.12.
72. Id. at 79.
73. See Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
74. Id
75. Id, at 438-39.
76. Id. at 434.
77. Id. at 434-35 (remarking that abortions in hospitals generally cost $850.00
$900.00 at that time, while abortions at a licensed clinic generally cost $350.00 -
$400.00).
78. Id. at 436 (noting that the Dilation and Evacuation procedure could safely be
performed in licensed clinics).
79. Id. at 438-39. However, the Court noted that the state's interest could reason-
ably be served through regulations which require that certain types of abortions be
performed only in hospitals, if medical concerns reasonably require that the procedure
be undertaken in a full-service hospital. Id, at 433-34, 438 n.27. The primary fault with
the Ohio statute was that it required that all second trimester abortions be performed
in hospitals. Id. at 433-34.
80. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
81. Id. at 511-15, 519.
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abortion in an unlicensed clinic.8 2 The Court reasoned that requiring
these procedures to be undertaken in a licensed clinic was not an un-
reasonable means of furthering the state's interest in protecting the
woman's health, because the licensing requirement enabled the state
to make certain that abortion procedures were performed "'under
circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.' "183
Finally, the Court struck down two state regulations that worked
mainly to discourage abortions under the guise of "informed con-
sent"8 4 procedures.85 Both Ohio and Pennsylvania required that, in
conjunction with obtaining a woman's informed consent to the surgi-
cal procedure, the physician involved had to disclose certain facts to
the woman such as: 1) that "the unborn child is a human life from
the moment of conception;" 86 2) that abortion is "a major surgical
procedure;"87 and 3) that "[m]edical assistance benefits may be avail-
82. Id, at 509, 519. The facts in Simopoulos were especially unsettling. A certified
obstetrician-gynecologist was indicted for violating a Virginia criminal abortion statute
which provided:
'[I]f any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or
other thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to pro-
duce abortion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such
abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. [However,]
there is no criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first
trimester... ; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester
.. (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances,
f . .; [or] (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life.'
Id. at 509 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(d) (1982)). The obstetrician had per-
formed many first trimester abortions at his unlicensed clinic. Id at 508. A seventeen-
year-old, unmarried high school student came to him and requested an abortion. Id,
The obstetrician examined her and found her to be five months pregnant, which is
well into the second trimestef of pregnancy. Id The young girl never informed her
parents of her decision to have an abortion. Id Instead, she returned to the clinic two
days later and was injected with a saline solution designed to cause premature labor
and abortion of the fetus. Id. Then, the girl rented a motel room and stayed there
alone, where she aborted her fetus, forty-eight hours after the injection, in the bath-
room. Id at 508-09. When the police found the fetus in the wastebasket at the motel,
they began an investigation which led to the arrest of the defendant obstetrician. Id. at
509.
83. Id. at 519 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973)).
84. "Informed consent" involves a patient agreeing to a surgical or other medical
procedure with full knowledge of the risks involved. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779
(6th ed. 1990).
85. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986).
It is important to note that the Court in Thornburgh stated that a true informed
consent procedure is both proper and constitutional. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760.
86. AKRON, OHIO, COD. ORDINANCES § 1870.06(3) (1978).
87. AKRON, OHIO, COD. ORDINANCES § 1870.06(5) (1978).
able for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care."88 In both Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health8 9 and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians,90 the Court declared these in-
formed consent procedures unconstitutional, reasoning that they
were not designed to further the state's interest in making sure in-
formed consent was obtained, but rather encouraged women to with-
hold their consent altogether. 91
In sum, state restrictions upon allowable abortion procedures that
are not reasonably related to a compelling state interest have been
consistently struck down since Roe.
2. The Consent Cases
Several states have enacted statutes which require that third per-
sons, including either husbands or parents of the mother,92 consent
to a woman's decision to get an abortion before the procedure can be
performed. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,93 the Court ad-
dressed a Missouri statute which barred abortions during the first tri-
mester unless the procedure was consented to by the woman's
husband.94 Two Missouri physicians challenged the constitutionality
of the statute and demanded declaratory and injunctive relief against
its enforcement.95 The Court declared the portion of the statute re-
quiring spousal consent unconstitutional, 96 holding that a state can-
not "'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is
absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy.' "97 Moreover, the Court in Planned
Parenthood specifically ruled that states could not grant any third
88. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(ii) (Purdon Supp. 1991). See also AKRON,
OHIO, COD. ORDINANCES § 1870.06(7) (1978) (requiring physicians to inform patients
that there are "numerous public and private agencies... available to assist her during
pregnancy and after the birth of her child .....
89. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
90. 476 U.S. 747.
91. Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-44 (ruling that a state may not adopt "abortion regula-
tions designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or child-
birth"); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (noting that the required information was not of a
nature that was always "relevant to the woman's decision" and, the statute, therefore,
was "plainly overinclusive").
92. For a discussion of parental consent and notification statutes, see infra notes
139-183 and accompanying text.
93. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
94. Id. at 85 (appendix to the Court's opinion). The Missouri statute at issue pro-
vided, in pertinent part: "No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy except: . . . [w]ith the written consent of the woman's
spouse, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order
to preserve the life of the mother .... Id.
95. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 56-57.
96. Id. at 69.
97. Id. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375
(1975) (Webster, J., concurring and dissenting)).
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party an absolute veto over a woman's decision to have an abortion.98
Reiterating its prior statement in Roe, the Court stressed that "'the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.' 99
3. The Public Funding Cases
While states customarily provide public funds for the expenses as-
sociated with ordinary childbirth, many states have refused to pro-
vide funding for abortions. When addressing the issue of whether
public funding for abortions is required, the Court has appeared to di-
verge from its holding in Roe which placed the abortion decision with
the woman to the exclusion of the state legislatures.10o
In Maher v. Roe,'Ol the Court considered Connecticut's decision to
refuse to give Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic102 abortions. In a
creative analysis of the type of fundamental rights guarded by Roe,
the Court determined that Roe does not protect a woman's funda-
mental right to abortion; rather, it protects only her freedom to de-
cide whether to have an abortion.l0 3 The majority chose to uphold
Connecticut's regulation, reasoning that the lack of public funding
merely encouraged childbirth and placed no additional obstacles in
the path of women who could not afford to pay for an abortion, since
the obstacle of poverty was pre-existing and not imposed by the
state. 0 4
However, the dissenting justices in Maher viewed the decision as
retreating from the notion, which they contended was firmly estab-
98. Id. at 69.
99. Id at 61 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)).
100. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
101. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
102. "Nontherapeutic" abortions are those that are not necessary to protect the
mother's life or health. Cf. supra note 27.
103. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
104. Ik at 474, 478-79. The Maher majority apparently chose to ignore prior cases
which established that the government's decision to fund one program and not another
may be unconstitutional if its purpose is to discourage the exercise of a constitution-
ally-protected right. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a
state may not grant unemployment compensation to some workers while denying it to
other workers who are discharged because of conflicts with the exercise of their reli-
gion).
However, the majority countered this criticism by claiming that if the above view-
point was upheld, the state could be required to pay for other private rights, such as
private education, just as it paid for public education, since the right to private educa-
tion had been established by the Court. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). The Court viewed this result as undesirable. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475-80.
lished in Roe, that the right to have an abortion is fundamental.105
Logically, the next issue addressed by the Court regarding public
funding was whether the states could refuse to fund even therapeutic
abortions. In Harris v. McRae,l0 6 the bitterly divided Court re-
sponded, 'yes.'107 The majority relied on the Maher holding in con-
cluding that economically disadvantaged pregnant women were no
worse off after the Court's holding, since the right created in Roe
merely prohibited governmental interference with the abortion deci-
sion.108 The Court asserted that the' recognition of a constitution-
ally-protected right produced no companion obligation by the
government to provide funds for the exercise of that right.109
As the dissenters in Maher and Harris would probably agree, by al-
lowing states to refuse to fund abortion expenses, the Court appeared
to be removing the abortion decision from economically disadvan-
taged women and returning it to the state legislatures and Congress,
the very entities from whom Roe was supposed to have removed it.
D. The Invitation to Increased State Regulation
It appears that, at the present time, several members of the Court
are more willing than ever to uphold increased state regulations upon
abortion. Specifically, in the 1989 decision of Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services,110 a plurality of the Court"' "implicitly sug-
gested that a woman's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy
would no longer receive heightened judicial protection.""12 While the
regulations upheld by the majority"13 in Webster were not especially
significant in changing the existing status of permissible state regula-
tion,114 statements found in dicta"l 5 and supported by a plurality of
105. Maher, 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
106. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
107. Id. at 328-29. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan
countered with the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Although this case dealt with the
issue of whether the federal government must provide funding for abortions, the prin-
ciple announced is analogous to the state funding issue.
108. Id. at 316-17.
109. Id. at 317-18. The Court noted that state governments have no duty to fund
other medically necessary operations. Id. at 309-11.
110. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
111. The plurality opinion in Webster contained the views of three justices, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy, the largest faction of justices
voting with the majority.
112. Dellinger & Sperling, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Abortion and
the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 87 (1989).
113. A five member majority in Webster, composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, voted to uphold the challenged Mis-
souri statute.
114. The most controversial regulation upheld within the state statute requires doc-
tors to test for fetal viability at twenty weeks, though the state of current technology
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the Court seemed to explicity invite states to propose new
regulations.
First, the plurality struck a blow directly at the integrity of the Roe
decision by attacking its "rigid trimester analysis," 1 6 calling it "'un-
sound in principle and unworkable in practice.' "117 In the next
breath, the plurality announced that the trimester framework should
be abandoned.118 The question now is to what extent states will be
able to avoid the restrictions formerly placed upon them by the tri-
mester framework in enacting future regulations and sustaining pre-
viously challengable regulations. The question can only be answered
as the Court decides future cases regarding state regulations which
test the framework, and the outcome will depend upon how many
justices choose to side with the Webster plurality's view.
The Webster plurality's direct invitation to additional state regula-
tion came in the form of cryptic statements, which neither guaran-
teed that the three-member plurality would vote to directly overturn
Roe if given the chance, nor clearly delineated the extent of limita-
tions the plurality intended to place upon the Roe holding. For in-
stance, the plurality stated that "Itihere is no doubt that our holding
today will allow some governmental regulation of abortion that
would have been prohibited under the language of [earlier Court de-
suggests that fetuses are not viable before twenty-four weeks. L. TRIBE, supra note 17,
at 21-22. Therefore, by upholding the state statute, the Court appeared to be sanction-
ing state regulation during the second trimester of pregnancy, which it specifically pro-
hibited in Roe unless the mother's health is determined to be at stake. See Roe, 410
U.S. at 163-64.
However, in looking beyond the face of the statute, it becomes apparent that the im-
pact of the Court's decision is less than significant in light of the fact that "there is a
roughly four-week margin of error in determining a fetus's actual gestational age." L.
TRIBE, supra note 17, at 21-22.
115. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58 (sections II-D and III 6f the Court's opinion).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3056 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985)). The plurality reasoned that the framework is "unsound in principle" because
its key elements are not contained in the Constitution. Id. at 3057. However, they
failed to take notice of the fact that the elements of most other important constitu-
tional doctrines are interpreted based on constitutional principles and are not found in
the text of the Constitution. See id, at 3071-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Likewise, the plurality determined that the framework is "unworkable in practice"
because it creates a "web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate resem-
bling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine." Webster, 109
S. Ct. at 3057. Again, the plurality was criticized for this determination because it un-
dertook no inquiry into whether lower courts had actually experienced difficulty in ap-
plying the framework. See id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 n.15.
cisions]."119 Somewhat apologetically, the plurality went on to say
that "[t]his case ... affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of
Roe,120 ... and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in
our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding
cases."121 How far they intend to narrow Roe, given the chance, is
unclear from their opinion.
Not only did the three plurality members indicate that they, them-
selves, would be amenable to increased state regulation of abortion,
but Justice Scalia explicitly stated in a concurring opinion that he fa-
vored overturning Roe.122 The other member of the Court who
might have joined the majority had Webster been the proper case to
overturn Roe is Justice O'Connor. She implied in her concurring
opinion that she might support this hypothetical majority's opinion
by stating that "[wihen the constitutional invalidity of a State's abor-
tion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v.
Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so
carefully."123
While the remaining four justices who made up the minority124 in
Webster clearly supported the Roe holding and its right of privacy
protections, there is no doubt that the above cited statements from
the majority justices in Webster "suggest that the constitutional tide
turned in 1989 for state regulation of abortion."' 25 This fact becomes
extremely evident in light of the Court's 1990 decision in Hodgson v.
Minnesota which upheld a significant burden upon a minor's ability
to obtain an abortion.126
E. Cases Addressing the Constitutional Rights of Minors
As long as Roe remains intact, the right of an adult woman to pur-
sue an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is protected
by her privacy right. However, if a minor wishes to pursue the abor-
tion option, the issue becomes more complex. No doubt with equal
protection principles in mind, the Supreme Court has stated that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
119. Id. at 3058.
120. The plurality suggested that the Webster case was not the appropriate vehicle
for overruling the Roe decision since the facts of Webster differed from those of Roe.
Id. They indicated that a case having the requisite similarity would involve a criminal
statute which would essentially prohibit all abortions, as did the statute in Roe. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
124. The minority was made up of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens.
125. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 24.
126. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
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adults alone."'127 Nevertheless, it is undisputed that a woman,
whether adult or minor, can be restricted in the exercise of her fun-
damental rights' 28 if the state can justify its restrictions based upon
compelling interests. 2 9 With that premise in mind, the Court has
painstakenly determined that some constitutuional rights can be en-
joyed by all persons regardless of their age, while some important
state interests justify restriction of other rights based upon age
differences.I3 0
Carey v. Population Services International 13 1 established that the
fundamental right of privacy enjoyed by adults is applicable to mi-
nors, at least in the area of contraception. 3 2 The Court has also rec-
ognized that "a pregnant minor has a substantial interest in being
free to choose to have an abortion."' 3 3 In apparent conflict, however,
is the view that "parents' rights to raise and train their children have
been granted a status approaching, if not achieving, fundamental-
ity."i 3 4 To provide a balance between these juxtaposed interests, the
Court has permitted states to exercise their police powers and parens
patriae3 5 authority to override parental rights when to do so is in a
child's best interest. 136 Therefore, if a minor wishes to exercise her
127. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1966).
128. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 58, at 418-19.
129. See supra note 58 (discussing the strict scrutiny standard).
130. Comment, Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Contraceptives, Abortion, and
Sterilization Without Parental Consent, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 235 (1977).
The Court has declined "to conclude that minors must be accorded the full panoply
of constitutional rights, coextensive in kind and degree with those accorded an adult."
Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA.
L. REV. 305, 315 (1974). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976) (acknowledging that states have broader authority to regulate the activities of
minors than of adults).
131. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
132. Id. at 693-94 (explaining that contraceptive decisions do not raise the life and
death issues of abortion).
133. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (emphasis added to illustrate that the
Court did not determine this interest to be afundamental right).
134. Note, Minors' Right of Privacy Versus Parental Right of Control, 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 297, 300 (1976). See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting
Amish parents to remove their children from school after the eighth grade); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing "liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (establishing parents' liberty interests in making educational decisions
for their children).
135. The parens patriae doctrine allows the states to override parental decision
making power when the child's welfare or best interests necessitate it. H. CLARK, LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 335-45 (2d ed. 1987).
136. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (approving of a
state's use of its parens patriae authority to prevent minors from purchasing obscene
right of privacy, she must demonstrate that her interests outweigh
interests asserted by both her parents137 and the state.13s
F. Parental Notification and Consent Statutes
Parental notification or consent laws are ,now on the books in
many states.X39 States assert various "compelling" interests pursuant
publications); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (approving of the order of lifesaving blood
transfusions for children over the objection of their parents who claim religious
grounds for their decision).
137. Legitimate parental interests include directing a child's emotional develop-
ment and protecting her physical and psychological health. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
138. Legitimate state interests include promoting parental authority and protecting
minors from their own immature decisions. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637, 640-
41 (1979).
139. Twenty-four states have consent statutes; 11 have notification statutes. Two
other states encourage, but do not require, parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision. The difference between notice and consent statutes is that under a consent
statute, a minor is prohibited from having an abortion without a parent's active con-
sent, while under a notice statute, a minor can have an abortion whether or not a par-
ent consents, provided a parent has been notified of the impending procedure. L.
TRIBE, supra note 17, at 202.
Those states with consent statutes are: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1, 26-21-3 to -8
(Supp. 1988)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3) (1986)); Arizona (ARuz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2152 to -2153 (Supp. 1988)); California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West
Supp. 1991)), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1991)); Colorado
(COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-1-1(1) (Repl. vol. 1986)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1790 (b)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1987)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1989)); Illinois (ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 81-54(3), 81-65 to -67, ch. 40, para. 1015 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(a)-(c) (Burns Supp. 1988)); Kentucky
(Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.732(2), 311.733 (Baldwin 1986)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:1299.33(D), 40:1299.35.5(A) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989)); Massachusetts
(MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12S (Law. Co-op. 1985)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-53(1), (3) (Supp. 1989)); -Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.1(1)-(3) (Vernon
1989)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-1, 30-5-3 (1978)); North Dakota (N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1), (2)(a)-(b) (Repl. vol. 1981), § 14.02.1-03.1 (1981 & Supp.
1987)); Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.7-6, 23-4.8-2 to -3 (1985)); South Carolina (S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-20(c), 44-41-30(b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985)); South Dakota (S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-303
(Supp 1988), 37-10-304, 394-202(f) (Repl. vol. 1982)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-76
(1990)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(a) (1988)); and Wyoming (WYO.
STAT. § 35-6-118 (1989)).
States with notice statutes are: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-16-801 to -808
(1990)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112(a)-(b) (Supp. 1988)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE
§ 18-609(6) (Repl. vol. 1987)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1597, 1597-A
(Repl. vol. 1980)); Maryland (MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (2), (6) (West 1989)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1-
405, 50-20-107 (1989)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347 (1985)); Nevada (NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 442.255, 442.2555 (Michie 1987)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.12(B)(1)(a) (Anderson 1987)); and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Repl. vol.
1978)).
Connecticut (1990 Conn. Acts 113 (Reg. Sess.)) and Wisconsin (WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.78(5) (West 1989)) require the abortion practitioner to encourage minors to notify
their parents. West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §§ 16-2F-3 to -5 (Repl. vol. 1985)) allows one
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to these statutes, and the Court examines them to determine
whether they are sufficiently important to override the minor's
claimed rights.140
The Court first addressed the constitutionality of consent statutes
in its 1976 decision, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.14i The Mis-
souri statute in that case required a minor to obtain the written con-
sent of one parent before undergoing an abortion. 42 The only
exception to the requirement was when the abortion was necessary
to preserve the life of the mother.4 3 The State of Missouri defended
the constitutionality of the statute by pointing to the Court's previous
decisions that had permitted states to limit the rights of minors.'"
Additionally, the state asserted that certain decisions are considered
to be "outside the scope of a minor's ability to act in his [or her] own
best interest or in the interest of the public."' 45 Finally, Missouri
claimed that, pursuant to the consent statute, it was protecting its le-
gitimate interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental
authority.146
In counterargument, the class representative physicians who repre-
sented Planned Parenthood in the litigation pointed out that "no
other Missouri statute specifically requires the additional consent of a
minor's parent for medical or surgical treatment...." 1 47 Moreover,
the physicians noted that the state allowed minors to legally consent
parent or a second physician to waive notice if a minor is mature or if the notification
would not be in her best interests.
The minority of states without either notice or consent laws are: the District of Co-
lumbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and Vermont.
140. "The Supreme Court has acknowledged three 'significant' state interests that
justify the regulation of a minor's abortion decision. These legitimate interests con-
cern (1) protecting the unique vulnerability of children; (2) recognizing a child's dimin-
ished capacity to make intelligent decisions; and (3) facilitating the traditional parental
role of child rearing." Comment, supra note 14, at 887 (footnotes omitted).
141. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
142. See id. at 84-89 (appendix to the opinion of the Court). The statute provided,
in pertinent part:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy except... [w]ith the written consent of one parent [or person who
stands in the place of the parent] if the woman is unmarried and under the
age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician,
as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.
Id. at 85.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 72. See also supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
145. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 72.
146. Id. at 75.
147. Id. at 73.
to other medical services related to pregnancy, venereal disease, and
drug abuse.148
In holding the Missouri parental consent statute unconstitutional,
the Court held that parents could not be given an "absolute, and pos-
sibly arbitrary, veto" power over their minor child's decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy.149 Even though the Court recognized that
states have somewhat broader powers to regulate the activities of mi-
nors than of adults, it held that no state interest in the family unit
could be served under the statute.150 The Court reasoned that an ab-
solute veto power placed with a nonconsenting parent created a situa-
tion of intense conflict between the pregnant minor and her
parent.151
Furthermore, the Court established that "[a]ny independent inter-
est the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the compe-
tent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." 5 2 Therefore,
the Court seemed to indicate that any "fundamental right" that par-
ents may contend they have153 in raising and controlling their chil-
dren never outweighs the competent minor's right to decide for
herself whether to have an abortion.
In Bellotti v. Baird,154 the Court was, once again, faced with a con-
sent statute. The Massachusetts statute at issue required every mi-
nor seeking an abortion to initially seek parental consent. 155 If the
parents refused to consent, then, as a secondary measure, the minor
could try to obtain consent from a state court judge.156 The Supreme
Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. 5 7
The Bellotti decision established what has been subsequently called
the "Bellotti framework," a test for determining the constitutionality
of consent statutes. 158 The framework provides that:
A pregnant minor is entitled in [an alternative proceeding] to show either: (1)
that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
148. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 431.061-.063 (Supp. 1975)).
149. Id. at 74. The Court adhered to the viewpoint that "[c]onstitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights." Id.
150. Id. at 74-75.
151. Id. at 75 (explaining that the family structure becomes fractured as soon as the
woman becomes pregnant).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
154. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
155. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977) (interpreting
the Massachusetts statute).
156. Id.
157. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 650-51.
158. See id. at 643-44 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently,
the desired abortion would be in her best interests.1 5 9
Hence, for a consent statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it
must provide for the initial alternative of judicial permission..
The Court first addressed a parental notice statute in H.L. v. Math-
eson.16 0 In Matheson, a Utah statute which required notification to
parents1 61 of an unemancipated162 minor who wished to terminate
her pregnancy was examined. Like the consent statute in Bellotti,
the statute in Matheson lacked a judicial bypass option. The Court
never reached the issue of whether notice statutes, like consent stat-
utes, must contain judicial bypass options163 because it determined
that, in the case at hand, the minor challenging the statute had failed
to show that she was, in fact, mature or emancipated. 164 Therefore,
Matheson, as decided by the Court, stands for the narrow proposition
that a state may legitimately require a minor's parents to be notified
in cases where an immature minor seeks an abortion.165
In 1983, the Court was faced with determining the validity of two
parental consent laws. The first was an Akron, Ohio city ordinance
which prohibited physicians from performing abortions on minors
unless the physician obtained the consent of one parent or an order
from a court.166 The Court in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
159. Id (footnote omitted) (avoiding the "'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto'"
struck down in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
160. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
161. The term "parents" was not defined within the Utah statute. Id, at 400-01. See
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2938 n.23 (1990) (analyzing the omission).
Therefore, because the statute was deemed ambiguous in that it did not specify
whether notice to one parent would be sufficient, the Court in Matheson never dis-
cussed whether notice to both parents would be required. Id.
162. "Emancipation" involves an entire surrender of the right to the care, custody,
and earnings of a child by his or her parents as well as a renunciation of parental du-
ties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 272 (5th ed. 1983). Emancipation is considered express
when there is a voluntary agreement between parent and child as to the status, and it
may be considered implied when either acts or conduct of the parent and child indicate
there is consent to the emancipation. Id.
163. But see Matheson, 450 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that the
Bellotti framework applies to parental notification statutes as well).
164. Id. at 405-06.
165. Id at 412-13.
166. See AKRON, OHIO, COD. ORDINANCES § 1870.05 (1978), which provided, in perti-
nent part:
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor pregnant wo-
man under the age of fifteen (15) years without first having obtained the in-
formed written consent of the minor pregnant woman ... , and (1) First
having obtained the informed written consent of one of her parents or her
legal guardian .. , or (2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an
order from a court... that the abortion be performed or induced.
tive Health 167 deemed the ordinance unconstitutional because it did
not explicitly provide for the mandated alternative procedure re-
quirements as set forth in the Bellotti framework.168 The Court
based its decision upon the fact that the statute contained no explicit
requirement that a court inquire into a minor's maturity or emanci-
pation. 169 In effect, the statute contained a blanket presumption that
all minors are too immature to make an abortion decision.170 Fur-
thermore, the statute created an assumption that an abortion is never
in a minor's best interests without parental approval.171 Therefore,
the Court established that, in order to pass constitutional muster, a
statute must strictly comply with the requirements set out in Bel-
lotti.172 It refused to assume that courts would always inquire into a
minor's maturity or best interests without the required provisions.173
The second statute was addressed in the companion case of
Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft.174 The Missouri statute
in question was enacted subsequent to the Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Danyforth,175 which found that Missouri's for-
mer parental consent statute unconstitutionally infringed upon a mi-
nor's right to privacy.176 The new statute required parental consent
prior to a minor's abortion and included an alternative provision for
judicial bypass. 177 This statute differed from the Akron ordinance in
that the Missouri statute required a court hearing a petition for judi-
cial bypass to make findings regarding the minor's maturity and best
interests.178 Hence, the Court determined that the Missouri statute
Id.
167. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
168. Id. at 439-40.
169. Id. at 441.
170. Id at 439-40.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 441.
174. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
175. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
176. Id. at 75.
177. Mo. REV. STAr. § 188.030.3 (Supp. 1982) provided, with regard to the judicial
bypass procedure:
A hearing on the merits of the petition .... shall be held as soon as possible
within five days of the filing of the petition .... At the hearing, the court
shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect,
and understanding of the minor .. . and any other evidence that the court
may find useful in determining whether the minor should be granted majority
rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion or whether the abortion is
in the best interests of the minor .... In a decree, the court shall for good
cause: (a) [g]rant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting
to the abortion; or (b) [ffind the abortion to be in the best interests of the mi-
nor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so
finding; or (c) deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the peti-
tion is denied ....
Id.
178. Id.
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was facially valid since it provided for a judicial alternative consistent
with the legal standards outlined in Bellotti.179
Finally, in its 1989 term, the Court was faced with two unique chal-
lenges by the plaintiffs in Hodgson v. Minnesota 180 and Ohio v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health 181 to parental notification
statutes.182 Minnesota and Ohio had enacted parental notice statutes
which facially complied with the Bellotti standards. However, the
plaintiffs in both cases attempted to show that, despite facial compli-
ance with established Supreme Court standards, the statutes as ap-
plied were unduly burdensome upon minors and failed to actually
further significant state interests. Additionally, there was growing
public sentiment that even judicial bypass procedures, in practice,
create serious obstacles to the exercise of a minor's right to obtain an
abortion, and hence, amount to impermissible state regulations. 8 3
Furthermore, since the decisions followed upon the heels of the con-
troversial Webster decision, the public anxiously awaited the outcome
of the Hodgson and Akron II cases to see if the Court would continue
its trend of upholding challenged state regulations.
III. HODGSON V. MINNESOTA
A. Facts of the Case and Procedural History
The parental notification statute at issue in Hodgson mandated that
179. 462 U.S. at 490-93.
180. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
181. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (companion case to Hodgson) [hereinafter Akron If].
182. The Hodgson statute was the most restrictive notification statute which the
Court had ever addressed in that it required notification to both parents of a minor.
See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938 (noting that none of the Court's previous opinions had
addressed the possible significance of making a consent or notice statute applicable to
both parents as opposed to just one).
The Ohio notification statute was novel in that, inter alia, it imposed more onerous
evidentiary burdens upon a minor seeking judicial bypass than those required in other
states. See Akron I, 110 S. Ct. at 2974-75.
Before the Court's recent Hodgson and Akron II decisions, only 14 states actually en-
forced their parental notification or consent laws. USA Today, June 26, 1990, at 1.
Those states were Alabama (consent), Arkansas (notice), Indiana (consent), Louisiana
(consent), Maine (notice), Massachusetts (consent), Missouri (consent), North Dakota
(consent), Rhode Island (consent), South Carolina (consent), Utah (notice), West Vir-
ginia (notice), Wisconsin (notice), and Wyoming (consent). Id. The other states
awaited a definitive Supreme Court ruling before considering enforcement. Id.
183. See Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-
Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (Nov./Dec. 1983) (concluding that ju-
dicial bypass laws "constitute a serious, and in some cases insurmountable, barrier con-
fronting minors who wish to obtain abortions") (hereinafter Judging Teenagers].
a minor's physician notify both of her parents18 4 at least forty-eight
hours before the abortion procedure was to occur.' 8 5 The minor
could avoid notification if she was emancipated; 8 if immediate ac-
184. Notification to both parents was required unless one of the parents was de-
ceased or could not be located through a "reasonably diligent effort." See infra note
185 for the statutory language of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2)-(4).
185. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989). Section 144.343 provides, in perti-
nent part:
(2) [N]o abortion operation shall be performed upon an emancipated minor
... until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has
been delivered in the manner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4.
(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of
the parent and delivered personally to the parent by the physician or his
agent.
(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be made by cer-
tified mail addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of the parent
with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee ....
(3) ... For purposes of this section, "parent" means both parents of the preg-
nant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if only
one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably dili-
gent effort....
(4) ... No notice shall be required under this section if:
(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical record
that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is in-
sufficient time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are
entitled to notice; or
(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse .... Notice of that declaration shall be made to the
proper authorities ....
(5) Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a misde-
meanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied
notification.
(6) (c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one
or both of her parents .... any judge.. .shall, upon petition, or motion, and
after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if
said judge determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giv-
ing informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that
the pregnant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim
to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an abor-
tion upon her without notification of her parents.. .would be in her best inter-
ests and shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion without such
notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman's best interests
would be served thereby.
(iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shall be confidential and shall
be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the court may
reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests
of the pregnant woman.
(iv) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any such pregnant
woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abortion without
notification. An order authorizing an abortion without notification shall not
be subject to appeal .... Access to the trial court for the purposes of such a
petition or motion, and access to the appellate courts for purposes of making
an appeal ..., shall be afforded such a pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven
days a week.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989).
186. The Court defined an "emancipated" minor as one "who is living separate and
apart from her parents or who is either married or has borne a child . Hodgson,
110 S. Ct. at 2931 n.3.
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tion was necessary to save her life; or if the minor alleged that she
was the victim of sexual abuse,187 physical abuse,188 or neglect. 189 Al-
ternatively, the minor could bypass the requisite parental notification
if she could convince a judge that she was mature enough to give in-
formed consent independent of her parents.190 If the judge deter-
mined she was not sufficiently mature, the minor could avoid notice
if she showed that an abortion without notification would be in her
best interests.19'
The plaintiffs in the litigation included two Minnesota physicians,
four Minnesota abortion clinics, a class of pregnant minors, and the
mother of a pregnant minor. 9 2 The plaintiffs claimed that the stat-
ute violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the Minnesota Constitution. 193
After finding that the two-parent notification requirement and the
forty-eight hour waiting period were unduly burdensome, 194 the
187. MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) defines "sexual abuse" as "any sexual
contact by a parent or other person responsible for the child's care or in a position of
authority with respect to the child."
188. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4) (West 1989). MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(d) (Supp.
1989) defines "physical abuse" as "any physical injury inflicted by a person responsible
for the child's care on a child other than by accidental means."
189. MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) defines "neglect" as "the failure of a
parent to supply a child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care when
reasonably able to do so or failure to protect a child from conditions or actions which
imminently and seriously endanger the child's physical or mental health when reason-
ably able to do so."
190. Id. at § 144.343(6)(c)(i).
191. Id.
192. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2934 (1990).
193. Id.
194. The district court determined that the 48 hour waiting period was invalid in
Minnesota because abortion clinics there are mainly located near metropolitan areas.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Minn. 1986). This fact creates a situa-
tion where abortion procedures are much less accessible in Minnesota than in the na-
tion as a whole. Statistics show that only 44% of women in Minnesota live in areas
where abortions are available, while nationally, 72% of women live in areas accessible
to abortion procedures. Id Therefore, to comply with the statute, many minors were
required to travel significant distances to undergo the procedure. Id. at 779-80. Be-
cause of the waiting period, a minor was forced to make two trips to the clinic or spend
three days in the city where the clinic was located. Id. Costs for the minor were in-
creased because of the travel required; her pregnancy diagnosis was often delayed; and
her privacy was threatened, since she might have to find a place to stay overnight. Id.
The district court found this situation created an undue burden upon minors, since the
state's interest in promoting parental consultation could be furthered with a shorter
waiting period. Id. at 780.
Additionally, the district court found that the two-parent notification requirement
was invalid because it actually inhibited parental consultation, since a minor who
otherwise would notify one parent but not the other would be discouraged from pro-
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled that
the entire statute was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforce-
ment.195 The district court made several findings of fact in support
of its conclusion, including the remarkable finding that the statute
had not resulted in any more minors actually notifying their parents
than prior to the statute's enactment.196
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting
en banc, reversed the district court's ruling.197 The court deter-
mined that subdivision six' 98 of the statute, which gave minors the
alternative options of notifying their parents or meeting the require-
ments of a judicial bypass procedure, was constitutional.199 However,
it rejected the state's assertion that subdivision two2 o of the statute
was likewise constitutional since it provided no bypass procedure.201
Finally, the court of appeals reversed the district court's determina-
tion that the forty-eight hour waiting period was unduly
burdensome.202
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Minnesota statute was, in whole or in part,
unconstitutional.203
viding any notification under the provisions of the statute. Id. at 769. Therefore, pur-
suant to this finding of fact, no alleged state interest in parental consultation could be
furthered.
195. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 780.
196. Id. at 775. The district court made a total of 74 findings of fact pursuant to its
determination that the Minnesota statute, as applied in fact, was unconstitutional. See
Hod gson, 648 F. Supp. at 759-70. See also infra notes 213-42 and accompanying text for
a discussion of those findings of fact in the Supreme Court.
197. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1466 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
198. See supra note 185 for the statutory language of MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343(6).
199. Hodgson, 853 F.2d at 1459. The circuit court determined that the notice statute
"plainly serves important state interests and is narrowly drawn to protect only those
interests .... Considering the statute as a whole and as applied to all pregnant minors,
the two-parent notice requirement does not unconstitutionally burden the minor's
abortion right." Id. at 1464-65 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the court found that the 48-hour waiting period did not create an undue
burden on minors because, it reasoned, "the waiting period could run concurrently
with the scheduling of an appointment for the procedure." Id. at 1466.
200. See supra note 185 for the statutory language of MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343(2).
201. Hodgson, 853 F.2d at 1456-57.
202. Id. at 1465 (finding that the problems with Minnesota's application of its notice
statute resulted from the "inaccessibility of abortion providers in Minnesota" and not
from the 48 hour waiting period).
203. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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B. Analysis of the Case
1. Majority Opinion
A majority of the Supreme Court 2O4 ruled that the portion of the
Minnesota statute which required notice to both parents of a preg-
nant minor was not reasonably related to any legitimate state objec-
tive.205 However, a separate majority of the' tourt206 concluded that
the portion of the statute which mandated that minors notify both of
their parents, unless the minor could obtain judicial permission,
passed constitutional scrutiny.207 In upholding the latter portion of
the statute, the majority reasoned that the bypass procedure con-
tained therein complied with the framework established in Bellotti
and validated by its progeny.2 08 The separate majority opinions will
be considered in turn.
a. Constitutionality of Parental Notification Statutes Without
Bypass Procedures
Justice Stevens expressed the views of one majority of the Court
by analyzing the constitutionality of the portion of Minnesota's notifi-
cation statute which contained no judicial bypass option.209 The mem-
bers of this majority relied heavily upon the district court's extensive
findings of fact concerning the availability of abortion services, the
application of the standards of the statute, and the effects of the stat-
ute.210 While the Court had considered the constitutionality of six
statutes requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion deci-
sion in the fourteen years preceding the Hodgson decision,211 the
204. This portion of the majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor.
205. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945.
206. Justice Kennedy wrote this portion of the majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. Justice O'Connor concurred to
complete the majority.
207. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2969-70.
208. Id. at 2970.
209. Id. at 2931. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989). See supra
note 185 for the text of statute.
210. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938-41 (reviewing the district court's findings of
fact). See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 759-70 (D. Minn. 1986) (setting
forth 74 separate findings of fact).
211. For an in depth discussion of the statutes previously considered by the Court,
see supra notes 139-183 and accompanying text. These statutes were considered in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (finding unconstitutional
the consent provision of a Missouri statute); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979)
(invalidating a Massachusetts consent statute); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13
(1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a Utah consent statute); Akron v. Akron
statute in Hodgson presented a difficult issue since it required, possi-
bly more burdensome, notification to both parents, instead of just
one.
2 1 2
The Stevens majority summarized the findings of fact it deemed
important to its decision.2' 3 It cited statistics presented to the district
court indicating that only fifty percent of minors in Minnesota live
with both biological parents.214 Further, because of the prevalence
of single-parent families, the Court deferred to the district court find-
ing that the two-parent notice requirement produced "particularly
harmful effects" upon minors and custodial parents in family situa-
tions affected by divorce or separation.21 5  The range of possible
harms could only increase in abusive or dysfunctional families. 216
Even in traditional two-parent families, the Court recognized that
requiring that both parents be notified could prove detrimental, espe-
cially if one parent was prone to violence.217 The Stevens majority
emphasized the district court's specific finding that the two-parent
notice requirement actually worked to impair family communication,
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 441-42 (1983) (explaining that the con-
sent provision of an Akron city ordinance did not pass constitutional muster); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983) (interpreting and upholding a
Missouri consent statute with a bypass provision); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150
(1976) (abstaining until the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute could be
more clearly addressed).
212. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938 (noting that none of the previous cases consid-
ered by the Court "focused on the possible significance of making the consent or the
notice requirement applicable to both parents .... ").
The Court found the two-parent notice requirement to be unusual when compared
to other state and federal consent regulations regarding minors. Id. at 2947 (citing 10
U.S.C. §§ 505(a), 2104(b)(4), 2107(b)(4) (1988) (requiring a minor wishing to join the
armed services to obtain the permission of one parent); 22 C.F.R. § 51.27 (1989) (deem-
ing the consent of one parent sufficient for a minor to obtain a passport for foreign
travel); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404, 46.405 (1988) (mandating that one parent consent for a mi-
nor to participate as a subject for medical research)). The Court further noted that
MINN. STAT. § 259.10 (1988) (which outlined a name change procedure) was the only
other statute in Minnesota requiring two-parent consent. Id.
213. See id. at 2938-40.
214. Id. at 2938 (citing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768).
215. Id (citing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 769). These harmful effects were mani-
fested when the minor experienced disappointment upon realizing that the communi-
cation to the absent parent did not reestablish their former relationship. Id. The
required communication could prove even more detrimental if the noncustodial parent
was abusive or easily provoked to violence. Id. at 2938-39. The court also pointed to the
"custodial parent" and the harmful effects occurring as a result of that parent's "an-
ger, resentment, and frustration," resulting from forced notification to the absent par-
ent, along with that parent's fear of violence from the noncustodial parent due to the
notification requirements. Id. at 2938.
216. Id. at 2938 (quoting Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769).
217. Id. at 2939 (citing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769). The Court again remarked
that family violence was a possible consequence. Id. The district court specifically rec-
ognized that many Minnesota minors were the victims of "rape, incest, neglect, and vi-
olence" by family members. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768.
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rather than enhance it.218 Moreover, it acknowledged the substantial
testimony at the district court level which established that the por-
tion of the statute in question did little to serve any state interest in
promoting the welfare of pregnant minors or in protecting parental
authority.219
Before reaching its conclusion, however, the majority considered
Minnesota's asserted state interests. Minnesota alleged that two state
ends were served by the statute.220 The first was the state's interest
in the welfare of pregnant minors.221 In response, the majority held
that "[t]o the extent that such an interest is legitimate, it would be
fully served by a requirement that the minor notify one parent
"222
The second state interest Minnesota asserted was an interest in
promoting the parental role "in the care and upbringing of their chil-
dren."22 3 The majority, however, denounced that asserted state
interest as illegitimate. 224 It reasoned that, while complete communi-
cation among family members may be beneficial under some circum-
stances, the state had no right to require such communication. 225
Therefore, the Stevens majority recognized that the first alleged
state interest had some merit under a one-parent notice statute but
deemed the second alleged state interest to be completely without
merit.22 6 Based upon its consideration of the district court's findings
of fact, the majority determined that the two-parent notice require-
ment in the statute did not reasonably further any legitimate state
interest.2 27
218. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769.
219. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2941 (quoting Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775). "At least 37
witnesses testified to the issue whether the statute furthered the State's interest in
protecting pregnant minors. Only two witnesses testified that a two-parent notifica-
tion statute did minors more good than harm; neither of these witnesses had direct ex-
perience with the Minnesota statute." Id.
220. Id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 2945 (emphasis added).
223.' Id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 2946.
225. Id. (holding that a state's interest in standardizing the structure of private
family life to meet some "state-designed ideal, is not a legitimate interest at all"). Con.
tra Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "[a] state pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it at-
tempts to foster and preserve the parent-child relation by giving all parents the oppor-
tunity to participate in the care and nurture of their children").
226. See id. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. Id. at 2945 (further pointing to situations where two-parent notification could
actually "disserve the state interest in protecting and assisting the minor").
Hence, after Hodgson, it is clear that future constitutional chal-
lenges to two-parent notification statutes, which do not provide for
judicial alternatives, will be succesful. 228
b. Constitutionality of Parental Notification Statutes With
Bypass Procedures
A different majority of the Court, whose opinion was expressed by
Justice Kennedy, addressed the portion of Minnesota's statute which
contained a judicial bypass procedure.229 The district court's findings
of fact regarding the judicial bypass procedure contained in the Min-
nesota statute noted that, during a five-year period while statistics
were kept, 3,573 judicial bypass petitions were filed within the
state. 230 Of those petitions filed, all but fifteen were granted.231 Fur-
thermore, the district court's findings pointed out that, despite the
large number of petitions heard, the confidentiality of minors re-
questing bypasses had been maintained.232
However, the district court noted that one problem with the opera-
tion of the bypass procedure was that some rural counties were
served by judges who refused to hear the petitions.233 Additionally,
judges who testified to the district court claimed that they could per-
ceive no positive benefits flowing from the Minnesota statute.23 4
Rather, they generally attested that the bypass procedure was an un-
necessary obstacle placed in the path of minors by the state, which
produced mainly negative effects.23 5 These effects included "fear,
228. The states which have either two-parent notification or consent statutes with-
out bypass procedures are: Arkansas (notice); Delaware (consent); Idaho (notice); and
Illinois (notice/consent). USA Today, June 26, 1990, at Al. However, only Arkansas
enforced its statute at the time Hodgson was decided. Id.
229. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2969. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West
1989). See supra note 185 for the full text of the statute.
230. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (1986) (covering the period from
August 1, 1981 until March 1, 1986).
231. Id. Of those fifteen petitions, only nine were denied, because six petitions
were withdrawn subsequent to filing. Id. For a discussion detailing why the petitions
were denied, see Findings of Fact, Nos. 56 & 57, Hodgson, 648 F. Supp, at 765.
232. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763. The judges involved took numerous steps to in-
sure confidentiality. For instance, they often held the hearings in their chambers,
rather than in open court; many destroyed their notes after interviewing petitioning
minors; and most referred to the petitioners by their first names only. Id. The district
court found that the confidentiality of minors had only been breached in a minute
number of cases. Id. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6)(c)(ii) (West 1989) (mandating
the confidentiality of judicial bypass proceedings).
233. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763. This situation resulted in an increased burden
on some minors who were forced to travel to other counties where their petitions
would be heard. Id. However, the district court found that, although an additional
burden was placed upon minors in some instances, the mere fact that some judges
would not hear the petitions was not fatal to the statute. Id.
234. Id. at 766. One judge testified that he could not "perceive any useful public
purpose to what [he was] doing in these cases." Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2940 n.29.
235. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 766.
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tension, anxiety, and shame" among the minors involved,236 who
often feared the court procedure more than the abortion operation it-
self.237 The end result was that some minors, who were either ma-
ture or whose best interests would be served by an abortion without
notification, chose to avoid the bypass option and, instead, notified
their parents or carried their babies to term.2 38
The Kennedy majority referred to the district court's finding that
twenty to twenty-five percent of minors who sought a bypass under
the statute had already notified one parent and were seeking a by-
pass only as to the other parent.239 Other findings showed that par-
ents who chose to accompany their minor daughters to court to seek
the bypass expressed similar anxiety-type reactions.2 40 After evaluat-
ing these apprehension-provoking circumstances, the district court
determined that the requisite court hearings burdened the privacy of
both the minor and the parent who chose to accompany her.241
Despite the district court's findings, this majority of the Court, in
accordance with Justice Kennedy's opinion, determined that the re-
mainder of the Minnesota statute, except for subdivision two, 242
which was struck down by the Stevens majority,24 3 was saved by the
judicial bypass procedure contained within subdivision six.244 The
Kennedy majority reached this decision by referring to the previ-
ously established "Bellotti framework"245 and concluded that the
236. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2940.
237. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763-64. Doctor Hodgson, one of the plaintiffs in the
action, testified that many of the minors who came to her following the court hearing
were "wringing wet with perspiration" and often intimated that the court procedure
was the worst part of the whole ordeal. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2940 n.29.
238. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763. Hence, it follows that the statute actually re-
stricted the number of abortions that would otherwise be performed.
239. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769. "The vast majority of these voluntarily informed
parents [were] women who [had] divorced or separated from spouses whom they [had]
not seen in years." Id.
240. Id. They were often angry that their consent was not considered sufficient
under the state law, and some feared that the involvement of the other, possibly abu-
sive, parent would cause additional strain on the family. Id.
241. Id.
242. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989). See supra note 185 for the full text
of the statute.
243. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2945.
244. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2970. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1989).
For the text of subdivision six, see supra note 185.
245. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.). A dis-
cussion of the Bellotti framework can be found, supra, at notes 158-59 and accompany-
ing text.
Minnesota statute met the prerequisites of that guideline.246 Specifi-
cally, the majority noted that the standards set out in Bellotti would
sustain a parental consent statute if it contained a judicial bypass op-
tion.247 Since such an alternative was sufficient to sustain a consent
statute, the Kennedy majority felt compelled to sustain Minnesota's
less burdensome notice statute.248
Moreover, the Kennedy majority, in choosing to uphold the re-
mainder of the Minnesota statute, asserted that the judicial bypass al-
ternative effectively allayed the fear expressed by the Stevens
majority that two-parent notice laws could be harmful to some
minors.249
Finally, the Kennedy majority stated that its decision could be al-
ternatively supported by the conclusion previously reached in Mathe-
son.
2 5 0 It interpreted the Matheson holding as establishing that two-
parent notice requirements without judicial bypass alternatives were
"Constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best interests
would be served by notice." 251 The majority then asserted that the
requirements of the Minnesota law were essentially the same as the
mandates of the Matheson law, since parents of immature minors,
whose best interests would be served by parental notice, would be no-
tified under either statute.252 Although similar notice requirements
would not be constitutional as applied to either mature minors or mi-
nors whose best interests would not be served by notice, the Kennedy
majority ruled that the bypass procedure was a constitutional means
of insuring that the rights of immature minors were protected.253
246. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
247. Id. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Bel-
lotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (opinion of Powell, J.). Although the consent statute in Bellotti
was struck down, Justice Powell went on to state the minimum requirements for such
a statute to be sustained. See id. Five justices who participated in the Bellotti decision
supported his opinion. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2970-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (outlining the opinions of the justices).
248. Hodgson,.110 S. Ct. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
249. Id. at 2970 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy stated that "[i]f one were to attempt to design a statute that would address
the Court's concerns, one would do precisely what Minnesota has done in... creat[ing]
a judicial mechanism to identify, and exempt from the strictures of the law, those
cases in which the minor is mature or in which notification of the minor's parents is
not in the minor's best interests." Id.
250. Id. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See gener-
ally H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). For a discussion of the Court's decision in
Matheson, see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
251. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This interpretation of the holding in Matheson was criticized by Justice Stevens.
See id. at 2938 n.23. Justice Stevens claimed that the Court in Matheson never deter-
mined that the state statute at issue applied to both parents, rather than just one. Id.
252. Id. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that "a
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In summary, laws which require notice to one or both parents of a
minor will withstand constitutional scrutiny so long as they include a
judicial bypass alternative.254
c. Constitutionality of Forty-Eight Hour Waiting Periods
Though not extensively considered by the Court, the Kennedy ma-
jority affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and declared con-
stitutional the forty-eight hour waiting period as contained in the
statute.25 5 It concluded that the waiting period was necessary in or-
der to allow time for notified parents to consult with their daugh-
ters.25 6 Additionally, it found the resultant delay which accompanied
the waiting period to be insignificantly burdensome.2 57
2. Separate Opinion Written by Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion 25 8 in which he addressed
Minnesota's requirement that a minor wait forty-eight hours after
notifying her parents before undergoing an abortion operation.259
He readily acknowledged the findings of fact from the district court's
opinion that "scheduling factors, weather, and the minor's school and
work commitments may combine, in many cases, to create a delay of
a week or longer between the initiation of notification and the abor-
tion."260 Nonetheless, he concluded that the forty-eight hour waiting
period furthered the legitimate state objective of "ensuring that the
minor's decision is knowing and intelligent."26 1
judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the applica-
tions of the law which are constitutional from those which are not").
254. See id. at 2971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Id. at 2969 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 143.343(2) (West 1989). See supra note 185 for the full text of the statute.
256. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2969 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
257. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, in
a separate opinion, agreed with this conclusion. Id. at 2944 (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(noting that the waiting period imposed only a "minimal burden" upon minors).
258. This portion of Justice Stevens's opinion was joined only by Justice O'Connor.
259. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2941-45 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
260. Id. at 2944 (opinion of Stevens, J.). See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765. The dis-
trict court further found that any delays in performing the procedure statistically in-
creased the medical risk for minors involved. Id. Delays, especially those over one
week, increased the risk and, sometimes, pushed the minor over into her second tri-
mester of pregnancy. Id.
261. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2944 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
3. Dissenting Opinion Written by Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion 26 2 rounded out the opposition
between his viewpoint and Justice Stevens's viewpoint. He expressed
the opinion that "the judicial bypass provisions of the [Minnesota
statute were] not necessary to its validity."263 It is apparent, then,
that the only point of agreement between the two justices involved
the validity of the forty-eight hour waiting period.26 4
Justice Kennedy asserted that subdivision two of the statute,265
which mandated that both parents be notified of a minor's decision to
have an abortion, was valid even though it contained no judicial by-
pass provision.26 6 In contrast to Justice Stevens's majority opinion,267
he felt that this portion of the statute was supported by legitimate
state interests. 268 Justice Stevens determined that Minnesota's as-
serted interest in promoting the parental roles related to child-rear-
ing in enacting the statute was invalid.26 9 However, Justice Kennedy
refused to agree that the Constitution prevented a state from ensur-
ing that both parents of a minor were informed of medical proce-
dures which the minor sought to undergo.270 He stated that "[a]
State pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it at-
tempts to foster and preserve the parent-child relation by giving all
parents the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of
their children." 271
262. Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Scalia.
263. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2965 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
264. For a discussion of the waiting period, see supra notes 255-57 and accompany-
ing text.
265. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 143.343(2) (West 1989). For the full text of the subdi-
vision, see supra note 185, subd. (2).
266. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2965 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
267. See id. at 2945 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
268. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2962 (positing that "a State has an interest in seeing that
a child, when confronted with serious decisions such as whether or not to abort a preg-
nancy, has the assistance of her parents in making the choice").
269. Id. at 2946 (opinion of Stevens, J.). See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Justice Stevens's opinion. Justice Kennedy pointed out how
Justice Stevens's views had apparently changed since writing a concurring opinion to a
previous decision by the Court to uphold a Utah notice statute. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at
2962; see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420-25 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). In
Matheson, Justice Stevens asserted that the notification statute at issue was valid as to
both mature and immature unmarried minors. Id. at 424-25. He claimed that the stat-
ute was based upon the legitimate state interest of ensuring that a child receives the
appropriate parental advice. Id. at 423.
270. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2962 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
271. Id. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added). He cited to cases which held that parents have a liberty interest in developing
close relationships with their children. Id. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-
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In support of Minnesota's two-parent notice requirement, Justice
Kennedy asserted that a state could take affirmative steps, presuma-
bly through legislation, to facilitate the "parent-child bond," and he
maintained that the state would be justified in assuming that the par-
ents would act in their child's best interests.272 He advocated against
assuming that a parent should be deemed unfit without giving that
parent an opportunity to prove otherwise. 273
Next, Justice Kennedy attacked the Stevens majority's position
which viewed the two-parent notice requirement as an attempt by
the state to force families to "conform to some state-designed
ideal."274 Justice Kennedy believed that no such purpose could be
found in the explicit words of the statute or through any reasonable
inference. 275 Rather, he observed that the state's interest in mandat-
ing notification to both parents was valid regardless of whether the
parents lived together or were separated. 276 Moreover, he stated that
"[h]ow the family unit responds to such notice is, for the most part,
54 (1982) (holding that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a funda-
mental liberty interest); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391-93 (1979) (recognizing
the parental interest in developing a substantial relationship with their child); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) (noting that the right to raise one's children is
among the basic civil rights of man).
272. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
273. Id. He relied on previous decisions by the Court to support his viewpoint:
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (holding that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents .. "); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (ruling that
parental rights can only be terminated after a hearing where the state proves allega-
tions of parental unfitness).
274. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). But see Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2956.
275. Id. at 2963 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. Id. at 2964 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He pointed
to the trend among state legislatures to deem a joint custody arrangement upon the
divorce of parents as the most beneficial custody arrangement for the children. Id.
Under a joint custody arrangement, both parents are legally responsible for making
important decisions for the child, including decisions regarding medical treatment. See
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19.5, at 816 (2d ed.
1987).
Justice Kennedy noted that the presumption existed under Minnesota law, as well,
that a joint custody arrangement serves the best interests of the child. Hodgson, 110 S.
Ct. at 2964 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 518.17(2) (Supp. 1989)). He observed that, even in cases where joint custody was not
awarded, the noncustodial parent still had a right to be notified of important medical
procedures and to have access to the child's medical records. Id. at 2964-65. Justice
Kennedy asserted that Minnesota's two-parent notice statute did nothing more "than
apply these general principles to the specific case of abortion." Id. at 2965.
beyond the State's control."277
Justice Kennedy claimed that subdivision three of the Minnesota
statute provided sufficient protection to minors in that it made excep-
tions for situations where notice would not serve the minors' inter-
ests, even though it contained no bypass alternative.278 These
exceptions provided that the notice requirement did not apply when
either or both parents could not be notified through a "reasonably
diligent effort."279 Additionally, he explained that notice was not re-
quired under the statute if the abortion was immediately necessary to
save the minor's life.280 Notice could also be waived if the minor
claimed she was a victim of physical or sexual abuse or neglect.281
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy stated that the Minnesota law did
"not place an absolute obstacle before any minor seeking to obtain an
abortion, and it represents a considered weighing of the competing
interests of minors and their parents." 282
4. Concurring Opinion Written by Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion 283 in which she ex-
pressed her support for the Court's decision to strike down subdivi-
sion two of the statute.28 4 Additionally, she agreed with the Court's
separate opinion that subdivision six of the statute was a constitu-
277. Id. at 2964 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
278. Id. at 2967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343(3) (1988)). For the text of the subdivision, see supra note 185,
subd. (3).
280. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(a) (1988)). For the text of the subdivision,
see supra note 185, subd. (4).
281. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(c) (1988)). For the text of the subdivision,
see supra note 185, subd. (4).
Justice Stevens's majority opinion, in contrast, asserted that this exception did not
effectively serve minors' interests in that most minors were reluctant to report abuse
because the recipient of such information was required to convey it to the proper state
authorities who would inevitably conduct an investigation into the matter. Hodgson,
110 S. Ct. at 2932 n.7.
Justice O'Connor expressed support for Justice Stevens's assertion. See id. at 2950
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She explained that the welfare department would conduct
the investigation and would be required to inform the parents of that investigation. Id.
(citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(10)(a) (1988)). Since the parents had a right of ac-
cess to information surrounding the investigation, the result was that the parents
would be likely notified of the abortion nonetheless. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 626.556(10)(c), (11) (1988)).
282. Id. at 2969 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283. Justice O'Connors's concurring opinion represented only her views; she was
joined by no other justices.
284. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2949-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The main fact
upon which she based her opinion was the District Court finding that only 50% of Min-
nesota's minors resided in two parent households. Id. at 2950.
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tional state regulation of abortion.285 She explained that by including
the bypass alternative, Minnesota had tailored its parental notifica-
tion statute in accordance with the standards established by Supreme
Court precedent.286 Significantly, this was the first time that Justice
O'Connor sided with the liberal wing of the Court in striking down a
regulation of abortion. 28 7
5. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Written
by Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall wrote an opinion 288 in which he agreed with the
Stevens majority that "Minnesota's two-parent notification require-
ment is not even reasonably related to a legitimate state interest."28 9
However, he "vehemently" dissented from the Kennedy majority's
opinion by disagreeing with the conclusion that the bypass procedure
saved the notification and delay requirements of the Minnesota stat-
ute.290 He based his dissent upon the premise that the bypass proce-
dure was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied.291
Justice Marshall focused upon the most politically controversial as-
pects of the Minnesota statute-its social impacts. He cited exten-
285. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She cited Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 90-91 (1976) (advocating judicial bypass procedures) and Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1978) (establishing prerequisites for constitutional bypass
procedures), as applicable precedent. Id. at 2950.
287. Facts on File, World News Digest, June 29, 1990, at F3.
288. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
289. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2951 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Therefore, he concluded that the strictures of the statute could never pass a
strict scrutiny test. Id.
290. Id. at 2960 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
291. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
noted that, in all of its opinions regarding consent and notice statutes, the Court had
only directed its attention to facial challenges to the statutes' judicial bypass proce-
dures. Id. at 2958 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In contrast,
he deemed it important in evaluating a statute's constitutionality to address the actual
burdens that the bypass procedures placed upon minors in practice. Id. (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He asserted that two problems were inherent with the Minnesota statute: (1) it sub-
stantially burdened a minor's right to privacy without promoting a concomitant com-
pelling state interest; and (2) it gave either a minor's parents or the court an absolute
veto over a minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 2951 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall noted that "Roe remains the law of the land," which means that
state laws limiting the fundamental right to obtain an abortion must pass the strict
scrutiny test and be narrowly drawn so as to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at
2952 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
sively to a collection of empirical data and reports, rather than a
string of judicial precedents. For example, he noted that fifty-one
percent of minors consulted their parents regarding abortion in states
without notice or consent statutes.292 Therefore he concluded that,
while the statute did not burden those minors who would opt to no-
tify a parent anyway, it significantly burdened minors who desired
not to provide notice.293 Justice Marshall asserted that forced notifi-
cation was extremely traumatic for most minors, often leading to a
family crisis.294
The statute was burdensome, he opined, in not only psychological
ways, but in physical ways as well. Justice Marshall noted that many
minors who dreaded notifying their parents chose to delay their abor-
tions, which increased the attendant health risks of undergoing the
operation.295 Combined with the fact that minors are known to delay
their abortions until fairly late in their pregnancies even without the
increased burdens created by statutes,296 he concluded that the signif-
icant burdens accompanying compliance with the notification re-
quirements are obvious.297
Justice Marshall found other possible burdens in the statute evi-
denced by the fact that one-third of minors affected by a notice stat-
ute in another state travelled out of state to seek abortions, rather
than choosing to comply with the local notification requirements. 298
Justice Marshall also cited statistics showing that nine percent of mi-
nors would rather effect self-induced abortions or seek out illegal
abortions than notify their parents.299 Other minors indicated that
292. Id. at 2952 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of
Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 284, 287, 288, 290
(1980)).
293. Id. at 2953 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
294. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part) (citing Osofsky &
Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychosocial Considerations, 21 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1161, 1164-65 (1978)).
295. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cates,
Schulz & Grimes, The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 NEW ENG. J. OF
MED. 621, 623 (1983)). This particular article stated that the number of deaths for mi-
nors under 19 progressively rises from 0.2 per 100,000 during the first eight weeks of
pregnancy to 7.8 per 100,000 after the 16th week. Cates, Schulz & Grimes, supra at
623.
296. 1 NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY,
PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING 114 (C. Hayes ed. 1987) (explaining several reasons for
the delay).
297. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2953 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
298. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cartoof &
Klerman, Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 AMERI-
CAN J. OF PUB. HEALTH 397, 399 (1986).
299. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2953 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra note 292, at 288). He also noted that a
100-times greater death rate accompanies illegal abortions as opposed to legal ones. Id.
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they would rather carry a fetus to term than tell their parents that
they wanted to terminate their pregnancies. 300 In response to that
social effect, Justice Marshall pointed out that a minor's risk of death
from childbirth was over nine times greater than the risk of undergo-
ing a legal abortion procedure. 30 '
Justice Marshall concluded that the forty-eight hour notice re-
quirement could not possibly pass constitutional scrutiny, since it
served only to compound harms created by the burdens accompany-
ing the notice requirement. 02 With regard to the notice require-
ment itself, Justice Marshall never reached the issue of whether it
could pass the strict scrutiny test because he determined that, in any
event, the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve the intended
state objectives. 30 3 He reasoned that for the majority of minors who
would voluntarily consult their parents regardless of the statutory re-
quirements, the notification mandate was "superfluous."30 4 For the
other minors who would not notify their parents if they had a choice,
he deduced that the forced notification would not result in beneficial
family communications, the broad objective behind the statute.305
Furthermore, Justice Marshall maintained that Minnesota's notice
statute was overbroad in that, under certain circumstances, it gave
parents the power to absolutely veto their minor child's wishes.30 6 -\
He explained that this phenomenon resulted because, following noti-
fication, some parents could exert extreme pressure on their vulnera-
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Greydanus & Railsback,
Abortion in Adolescence, 1 SEMINARS IN ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 213, 214 (1985)).
300. See Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra note 292, at 289, 291.
301. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2954 ( Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Greydanus & Railsback, supra note 299, at 214).
302. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In response to
Justice Stevens's statement that the waiting period imposed only "a minimal burden"
upon minors, Justice Marshall replied that "[c]ertainly no pregnant woman facing
these heightened risks to her health would dismiss them as 'minimal.'" Id. (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303. Id. at 2955 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He re-
ferred to the only state interest deemed legitimate by the majority-that of "protecting
the well-being of minors." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Melton,
Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortions: Unintended Effects, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
79, 81 (1987) (indicating that forced notification was "unlikely to result in meaningful
discussion about the daughter's predicament")).
306. Id. at 2956-57. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "In
such circumstances, the notification requirement becomes, in effect, a consent require-
ment." Id. at 2956.
ble daughters.3 07 Because, a state cannot allow anyone, including a
minor's parents, in accordance with constitutional precedents, to ex-
ercise an unlimited veto power over a minor's decision, Justice Mar-
shall opined that the operation of the statute created unconstitutional
ramifications.30 8
Justice Marshall further argued that the bypass procedure did not
save the Minnesota statute because that procedure created an abso-
lute veto power among judges,3 0 9 a situation which could result when
a judge refused to authorize an abortion.310 For minor women who
determined they could not notify their parents, he felt that the by-
pass procedure amounted to an unconstitutional veto over their re-
quest to obtain a legal abortion.3 "1 Thus, minors in that position
were faced with only the alternatives of carrying their babies to term
or seeking illegal abortions.
Finally, Justice Marshall posited that, even if the bypass procedure
was constitutional, it amounted to nothing more than a "rubber
stamp" proceeding since very few petitions were ever denied.31 2
Since the courts provided no beneficial counseling of any kind to the
petitioning minors, Justice Marshall determined that the proceed-
ings, in practice, served no legitimate state interest.313 In fact, the
State of Minnesota had conceded in oral argument before the court of
appeals that it would be unconstitutional to subject all minors seek-
ing an abortion to judicial approval requirements.3 14 Because of that
concession, Justice Marshall questioned how Minnesota's judicial by-
pass procedure could save the statute's already burdensome notifica-
307. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
noted that the pressure could take several forms: "stern disapproval, withdrawal of
financial support, or physical or emotional abuse ...... Id
308. Id. at 2956-57 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id. at 2957 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall quoted Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Bellotti: "The provision of an
absolute veto to a judge . . . is to me particularly troubling .... It is inherent in the
right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public
scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third par-
ties." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
310. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2957 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
311. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
312. Id. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing dis-
trict court statistics in Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765).
Justice Marshall took note of additional statistics which indicated that the hearings
usually lasted no longer than fifteen minutes and experts were rarely called to testify.
Id. (citing Melton, supra note' 305, at 79-80). Additionally the courts provided no coun-
seling to aid the minor in her decision. Id.
313. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
314. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1469 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, C.J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 18: 955, 1991] Hodgson v. Minnesota
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion and waiting period requirements. 315
6. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Written by Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia concurred with the Kennedy majority's position that
Minnesota's notification statute combined with its judicial bypass pro-
cedure passed constitutional muster.31 6 Additionally, he opposed the
viewpoint expressed by the Stevens majority that the portion of the
statute without judicial bypass should be stricken.317 Finally, Justice
Scalia wrote a small passage only to reiterate his often expressed
opinion that the courts are not the proper forum for addressing and
developing abortion laws.3 1 8 Rather, he advocated, in accordance
with his position on previous occasions, that abortion related deci-
sions should be made by the legislatures.319
IV. IMPACT OF THE HODGSON DECISION
Hodgson does more than reiterate the traditional standard regard-
ing minors' abortion rights. The case is significant for several rea-
sons. First, it is the initial abortion case to be decided by the
Supreme Court since the Webster decision was handed down. Sec-
ond, it appears to do exactly what critics of the Webster decision fore-
casted-by upholding the most restrictive notice statute in the nation,
it proves that the Court is amenable to increased state regulations in
the abortion arena.3 20 The popular question is whether the Court is
planning to abandon Supreme Court control over the abortion issue
by allowing the regulatory power to fall back into the hands of the
states. Therefore, in the following analysis of the expected impacts
from the Hodgson decision, not only will the potential impact upon
minors be evaluated, but also the potential impact upon the current
315. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2960 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
316. Id. at 2969-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317. Id. at 2961-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. See id. at 2960-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia stated that he continued "to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion
Code and from the illusion that we have authority to do so." Id. at 2961.
319. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., Ohio v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that abortion should be a matter left to the political processes); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rec-
ognizing abortion as a political, rather than a judicial, issue).
320. After the Hodgson decision was handed down, some pro-choice advocates
grudgingly forecasted further erosions of the abortion rights established in Roe. News-
day, June 26, 1990, at 4.
status of permissible state regulation of abortion in general will be
considered.
A. Judicial Impact
1. Companion Case-Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 321 was decided on
the same day as Hodgson. The statute at issue makes it a crime for a
physician to perform an abortion upon a minor unless he provides no-
tice to one of the child's parents.3 22 It provides an alternative judicial
bypass procedure if the minor can present "clear and convincing"
proof that she is either mature or that an abortion without notifica-
tion is in her best interests.3 23 It was this stringent burden of proof
321. 110 S. Ct. 2972'(1990) [hereinafter Akron II.].
322. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Supp. 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
(A)(1)(a) No person shall knowingly perform or induce an abortion upon a
woman who is pregnant, unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and un-
emancipated unless at least one of the following applies:
(i) [Tihe person has given at least twenty-four hours actual notice, in person
or by telephone, to one of the woman's parents...;
(ii) One of the woman's parents... has consented in writing to the perform-
ance or inducement of the abortion;
(ill) A juvenile court... issues an order authorizing the woman to consent to
the abortion without notification of one of her parents...;
(iv) A juvenile court or a court of appeals, by its inaction, constructively has
authorized the woman to consent to the abortion without notification....
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that compliance
with the requirements of this section was not possible because an immediate
threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of the pregnant woman
from the continuation of her pregnancy created an emergency necessitating
the immediate performance or inducement of an abortion.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of unlawful abortion, a misde-
meanor of the first degree. If the offender previously has been convicted of or
pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, unlawful abortion is a felony of
the fourth degree.
(E) Whoever violates this section is liable to the pregnant woman and her
parents ... for civil compensatory and exemplary damages.
323.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Supp. 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
(A) A woman who is pregnant, unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and
unemancipated and who wishes to have an abortion without the notification of
her parents . .. may file a complaint in the juvenile court of the county in
which she has a residence ... requesting the issuance of an order authorizing
her to consent to the perfomance or inducement of an abortion without the
notification qf her parents....
The complaint shall be made under oath and shall include all of the following:
(4) An allegation of either or both of the following:
(a) That the complainant is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to
intelligently decide whether to have an abortion without the notification of
her parents....
(b) That one or both of her parents ... was engaged in a pattern of physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that the notification of her parents
... is not in her best interest.
(C)(1) [I]f the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the com-
plainant is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide intelli-
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placed upon the minor in the proceeding which concerned the Court.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,324 concluded, in the
wake of the Hodgson decision, that Ohio's one-parent notice require-
ment complied with Supreme Court precedent.3 25 However, the
plaintiffs in the action, an Ohio abortion clinic, an Ohio physician,
and a pregnant minor, among others, maintained that a bypass proce-
dure could not constitutionally require a minor to prove her maturity
or best interests under a clear and convincing standard.326 Moreover,
they asserted that the burden of proof should rest with the state en-
tirely.32 7 They contended that when a state "seeks to deprive an indi-
vidual of liberty interests, it must take upon itself the risk of
gently whether to have an abortion, the court shall issue an order authorizing
the complainant to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion
without the notification of her parents....
(2) [I]f the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is evi-
dence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the complainant
by one or both of her parents... or that the notification of the parents ... of
the complainant otherwise is not in the best interest of the complainant, the
court shall issue an order authorizing the complainant to consent to the per-
formance or inducement of an abortion without the notification of her
parents....
324. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia.
325. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2978 (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
Significantly, the Court went on to state that it need not decide whether a law re-
quiring one-parent notification with no judicial bypass alternative would be constitu-
tional, as the issue was not before it. Id. at 2979. See also id. at 2985 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that the majority in Akron II failed to decide whether a one-
parent notice statute must contain a bypass procedure).
326. Id. at 2981. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Akron II,
agreed with the plaintiff. He believed that the strictures of Ohio's statute itself and its
unique bypass procedure placed significant obstacles in the path of minors seeking
abortions. These statutory procedures amounted to "poorly disguised elements of dis-
couragement for the abortion decision." Id. at 2985 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763
(1986)). He contended that the majority's decision to uphold the standard of clear and
convincing proof unduly burdened the minor involved and "demonstrat[ed] a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the real nature of a court-bypass proceeding." Id at 2989.
He stressed that a bypass proceeding is designed to work like an interview between the
judge and the minor, not like an evidentiary proceeding. Id. at 2990. He concluded
that, since the minor's fundamental rights were at stake, a stringent burden of proof
would not benefit her interests. Id.
Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall. They
formed the same trio who dissented in Hodgson. See supra notes 288-315 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Marshall dissent in Hodgson.
327. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2981.
error."328
In response, the Court referred to the benchmark standard in Bel-
lotti,329 where the Court held that a state may require a minor to
bear the burden of proof in showing her maturity or best interests.330
Furthermore, the Court ruled that since a bypass proceeding was
merely ex parte331 in nature, the clear and convincing standard im-
posed no undue burden upon the minor involved.3 32
Therefore, while Hodgson stands for the proposition that two-par-
ent notice requirements accompanied by judicial bypass procedures
are constitutional state regulations, Akron II adds to the states' au-
thority by holding that: 1) a minor can be required to shoulder the
burden of proof in a bypass procedure; and 2) the minor can constitu-
tionally be required to meet a clear and convincing standard in satis-
fying her burden of proof.
2. Changes on the Court-Membership and Philosophy
The most interesting question regarding abortion circulating
throughout the popular press is whether the Court will overrule Roe
v. Wade in one fell swoop. Or, will they continually chip away at its
protections until it dies a slow and painful death?
President Bush's administration urged the Court in its considera-
tion of Hodgson to take the opportunity it passed up with the Web-
ster decision to overrule Roe.3 33 Even though the Court declined the
presidential invitation, some civil libertarians still consider the Hodg-
son and Akron II decisions to be strong blows to Roe's integrity.
3 34
328. Id. The plaintiffs relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), for sup-
port. Id. In Santosky, the Court held that the function of a standard of proof was "a
societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the liti-
gants." Id. at 755. Further, the Court in Santosky noted that the clear and convincing
standard is normally employed to promote fairness in governmentally-initiated pro-
ceedings by imposing the burden of proof upon the government where an individual is
threatened with the deprivation of his or her liberty interests. Id. at 756.
329. Akron I, 110 S. Ct. at 2981 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
330. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
331. An ex parte proceeding is conducted for the benefit of one party only; there
are no adverse witnesses, and the evidence presented by the party is not contested.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 297 (5th ed. 1983).
332. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2981-82 (defining "clear and convincing evidence" as
"that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established," and pointing
out that it rises above a "mere preponderance," but does not rise to the level of "be-
yond a reasonable doubt," as is required in criminal cases).
333. Facts on File, World News Digest, June 29, 1990, at F3. President Bush is a
staunch supporter of the pro-life position. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 170. In apparent
conflict with his position is a statement he made during Reagan's 1980 campaign for
the Republican presidential nomination: "I happen to think [the Roe decision] was
right." McQueen, Bush's Vacillating Statements on Abortion Issue Lead to Criticism
from Both Sides, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1989, at A20.
334. Newsday, June 26, 1990, at 4 (quoting the attorney for the American Civil Lib-
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Whether the Court will specifically reverse Roe in the near future
can only be hypothesized. However, an analysis of the changes in the
membership of the Court since Roe sheds great light on the issue.
The Roe v. Wade decision emerged into the American political
spotlight supported ,by seven justices and opposed by only two. 3 35
Following Roe, pro-life supporters began almost immediately to en-
courage change to the new state of the law.336 First, they attempted
to gain support in Congress for a constitutional amendment which
would effectively limit or overturn the Roe holding.337 Because the
process of acquiring a constitutional amendment is very difficult,338
these initial efforts failed.339 Hence, the pro-life forces began efforts
to encourage change to the membership of the federal judiciary to a
majority of right-to-life advocates.340 This secondary effort was real-
ized with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, who sup-
ported the pro-life position and helped enact its plan by appointing
over half of the members of the federal judiciary during his terms in
erties Union as saying "Roe is in severe jeopardy. This is one more confirmation that
we no longer have a majority of the Court."). Further, the president of Planned
Parenthood of New York City accused the Court of "turning its back on the most vul-
nerable of young women." Id.
335. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also supra note 55.
336. M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 40
(2d ed. 1990). See also Ball, Case Tactics and Court Strategies for Reversing Roe v.
Wade, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE
COURTS 186 (1987). There, the author outlined the strategy of the Right to Life cam-
paign: "Let them be assured that what we have in mind is not circumvention, but in-
stead, a total erasure of legal access to abortion on demand .... [I]t is an open effort
[and] will involve moves both to chip away at the props now thought to uphold Roe
and to forthrightly destroy the entire artifice." Id.
337. M. O'BRIEN, supra note 336, at 41. These efforts were termed "right to life"
amendments. Id. at 41-42. Some proposed amendments advocated returning the con-
trol of abortion regulation back to the states. Id. Others were introduced by Senators
Hatch and Helms and advocated for the recognition of fetuses as "persons." Id. Still
other amendments were proposed that sought to restrict federal court jurisdiction over
the abortion issue. Id.
338. Any proposed amendment requires the approval of two-thirds of both houses
of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures. U.S. CONST., art.
5. An alternative method allows for the initial approval by two-thirds of the states,
who must first call a constitutional convention. Id. However, this latter method has
never been used. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 151.
339. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 17.
340. Id. They believed that these judges would interpret the Constitution differ-
ently than the Supreme Court had in preceding cases by not protecting a right to abor-
tion. Id. Because lower court judges hear a majority of the challenges to abortion
laws, they expected to gain some positive ground for their side. Wardle, Judicial Ap-
pointments to the Lower Federal Courts: The Ultimate Arbiters of the Abortion Doc-
trine, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 336, at 218.
office.341 President Reagan never hid the fact that, a potential judge's
view on the abortion issue was critical to his or her appointment.3 42
Most significantly, Reagan appointed three new conservative jus-
tices to the Supreme Court, all of whom replaced members of the
former Roe majority.343 The first new justice to join the Court was
Sandra Day O'Connor.3 44 After Justice O'Connor was appointed, it
was quickly apparent that the Roe supporters had shrunk to six.345
She strongly dissented in the first abortion case she heard, Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health,346 to the Court's decision to
strike down a state regulation of abortion.34 7 There, she explicitly
stated her belief that "the State's interest in protecting potential
human life exists throughout the pregnancy." 348
By the time Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists349 was decided in 1986, the Roe majority had shrunk
further to five through an apparent change of heart by then Chief
Justice Burger.350  In Thornburgh, Justices White, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and the Chief Justice all called for Roe to be "reexam-
ined."35' Shortly thereafter, Chief Justice Burger announced his res-
ignation, and was replaced by the new Chief Justice Rehnquist, one
of the original Roe dissenters.352
To fill the Court's empty slot, President Reagan, in 1986, appointed
his second hand-picked justice, Antonin Scalia.353 Justice Scalia has
openly expressed his view that Roe should be directly overruled.354
Hence, the split in the Court following his appointment remained
five to four in favor of Roe.
341. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 17.
342. Id
343. Id. At the time of this writing, only three justices of the Roe majority remain
on the Court: its author, Justice Blackmun; Justice Marshall; and Justice Stevens.
Justices Blackmun and Marshall are both over eighty. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND
PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 391 (2d
ed. 1985).
344. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 343, at 392.
345. Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart who had vacillated between pro
and con positions in the Court's abortion opinions. Wardle, supra note 340, at 217.
346. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 73-79 and ac-
companying text.
347. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (strongly criticizing Roe's
trimester framework as an illegitimate legal concept).
348. Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see supra note 287 and accompanying
text.
349. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 84-91 and ac-
companying text.
350. M. O'BRIEN, supra note 336, at 45.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 20.
354. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that Roe v. Wade should be explicitly overruled).
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Following the retirement of Justice Powell in 1987, President Rea-
gan nominated one of the most controversial candidates in Supreme
Court history, Judge Robert H. Bork, to fill the position. 35 5 Judge
Bork was widely known for his opinion that an individual right to
privacy is not protected by the Constitution. 356 His nomination was
rejected by the Senate.357
Justice Kennedy was eventually confirmed to fill the open position
on the Court. He is touted as a conservative and has often sided in
opinions with known strong conservatives, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.358 Furthermore, in 1990, he evidenced his stance
on state regulation of abortion by writing the majority opinions in
both Hodgson and Akron II, where parental notice statutes were up-
held by the Court.35 9 Hence, the waning Roe supporters have appar-
ently shrunk to four justices.
The Webster case provided the first vehicle for testing the new
Court members' opinions as a group. However, it was a majority with
splintered views that voted to uphold the Missouri regulations at is-
sue.360 While the five conservative members of the Court predictably
favored the specific state regulation in question, certain members of
that group refused to use Webster to reconsider Roe.361
It was this same five-member majority which upheld the parental
notification statutes in Hodgson and Akron II but, once again, avoided
a direct attack on Roe. When, and if, the appropriate case comes
before the Court, it appears that the majority's position can only be
strengthened by the newest Supreme Court Justice, David H. Sou-
ter.362 He takes the place of the long-standing liberal, Justice Wil-
355. M. O'BRIEN, supra note 336, at 45. His nomination was opposed by a wide mar-
gin in the Senate--58 for, 42 against. Id&
356. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 169.
357. Id. at 170.
358. Id. at 19.
359. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2926-70 (1990); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2978 (1990).
360. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
361. A three-member plurality (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Kennedy) criticized the "rigid trimester framework" created by the Roe Court but con-
cluded that the facts of Webster were not sufficiently similar to those in Roe to provide
the proper basis upon which to review that decision. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 (plu-
rality opinion). Justice Scalia disagreed and stated that he would have voted to over-
rule Roe through Webster without hesitation. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor indicated only that, when confronted with the proper case, she
would reexamine Roe "carefully." Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
362. Souter was sworn in on October 9, 1990. U.S.L.W., Oct. 10, 1990, at 1. Presi-
dent Bush trusted the advice of people who helped President Reagan pick the con-
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liam Brennan,363 an original Roe supporter.3 64
Justice Souter's personal views on abortion are not clear, but
prochoice advocates, nonetheless, opposed his confirmation.3 65 Kate
Michelman, executive director of the National Abortions Rights Ac-
tion League, expressed her concern that Souter might "destroy 17
years of precedent and cast the deciding vote to overrule Roe v.
Wade."366 In Senate confirmation hearings, Souter expressed his
agreement that a right to privacy exists under the Constitution, but
indicated that he had not made up his mind which way he would vote
should Roe be reconsidered. 36 7 He emphasized that he "will listen to
all sides of an issue before reaching a decision." 368 Indeed, liberal
senators generally agreed that Justice Souter was probably the most
moderate nominee they could have hoped for from the Bush
administration.369
Therefore, it appears that as Justice Souter joined the Court in its
1990 term, Roe was threatened by at least five and, possibly, six jus-
tices. While parental notification and consent cases may not provide
the vehicle by which the Court seeks to put Roe at issue,370 the deci-
sions in those cases at least provide support for the increased state
regulation which will eventually breed the proper case. Prolife advo-
servative Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Eastland, When Anonymity
Becomes a Virtue, L.A. Times, July 25, 1990, at B13, col. 2.
363. Justice Brennan has been called "perhaps the Court's most effective propo-
nent of individual rights, ever." Stewart, The Great Persuader, A.B.A. J., November
1990, at 58.
364. See supra note 55.
365. Abortion-rights leaders attacked him as a "total disaster for civil rights and
women's rights." L.A. Times, September 19, 1990, at A16.
366. Anderson, "Stealth Nominee" Questioned, A.B.A. J., November, 1990, at 16.
367. Id. at 14. He believed it was likely, however, that Roe would be reexamined in
the near future. Id.
Senator Edward Kennedy, a noted liberal, was somewhat troubled by the fact that,
while Souter served in the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office, he had "'re-
ferred to abortion as the killing of unborn children, and opposed the repeal of an un-
constitutional state abortion statute.'" Id at 16. Souter defended that when asserting
those positions, "he was acting as an attorney in the service of his client, the governor
of the state .... Id.
368. Id. at 14.
369. L.A. Daily News, September 28, 1990, at 22, col. 1.
370. See supra notes 333-34 and 361 and accompanying text. See also Rosenblum &
Marzen, Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts, in ABORTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 336, at 202 (stating that these statutes probably do not
threaten any of "Roe's core principles").
While these types of statutes may not strike at the heart of Roe, it is very likely that
the Supreme Court could face a new challenge regarding permissible state regulation
under parental notification statutes. The Supreme Court explicitly left open the issue
of whether. one-parent notification statutes could pass constitutional muster without a
bypass procedure. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972,
2985 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Therefore, states seeking to expand their regu-
latory powers are likely to rise to the occasion and enact statutes in this gray area to
test Supreme Court leniency.
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cates, who support the statutes, concede that parental notice and con-
sent laws may not pose the ultimate threat to Roe, but for now they
are content to pursue a step-by-step strategy to dismantle its
principles. 371
B. Legislative Impact
While Roe's protections remained basically intact immediately fol-
lowing Hodgson and Akron II, pro-choice advocates warned that the
decisions would encourage additional regulations by state legisla-
tures.372 At the very least, the decisions will allow several states,
which previously had not enforced their parental notice and consent
laws, to begin enforcement.3 73 The move for legislative reforms be-
gan following the Webster decision, one year prior to Hodgson and
Akron II, which basically invited increased state regulation.374 The
National Right to Life Committee placed itself at the forefront of
these efforts.375 Those efforts paid off, for over 350 anti-abortion bills
were introduced across the country.376 These proposed laws gener-
ally took the form of: (1) laws requiring women to be informed of al-
ternatives to abortion; (2) parental consent or notification laws; (3)
laws granting rights to the father of the unborn child; and (4) laws
prohibiting abortions sought for specific reasons, such as sex selection
or birth control.377
While most of the bills appeared innocuous enough on the surface,
some were actually disguised efforts to ban abortions in virtually all
cases. For example, many bills were introduced as restrictions on
371. San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1990, at A12, col. 1. This strategy is espe-
cially effective in states where the legislatures are not solidly in support of the pro-life
position. Id. The strategy is a familiar one: swallow several small bites, instead of
choking on one big one.
372. Newsday, June 26, 1990, at 54. Another source stated that "the Supreme
Court's latest pronouncement on abortion [referring to Hodgson and Akron II] all but
guarantees a continuing legislative maelstrom." Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at Al.
373. Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at Al. For states affected, see supra notes 139 and
182.
374. San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1990, at A12.
375. Id. Membership in the National Right to Life Committee rose by as much as
33% during the year between the Webster and Hodgson decisions. Wash. Post, June
15, 1990, at A22.
376. San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1990, at A12.
377. Balz, Abortion-Rights Groups Map Strategy to Protect Access, Wash. Post, July
8, 1989, at A2. These laws were part of a new, subtle strategy by the Right to Life
Committee. Previously, they had encouraged the enactment of the strictest abortion
laws possible; now, in the wake of Webster, they proposed laws which, on the surface,
appeared moderate, in an effort to gain political support. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at
177-78.
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abortions for "birth control purposes." 378 However, upon close read-
ing, it became apparent that the true purpose of the proposed stat-
utes was to ban all abortions except in cases of rape, incest, fetal
deformity or where the pregnancy threatened the life of the
mother.379
While most of the proposed laws failed in their respective state leg-
islatures, prolife advocates won several key victories.38 0 Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia and Guam all signed new
regulations into law.381 The most restrictive of these was enacted in
Guam, where abortions were generally banned except under special
circumstances.38 2 Guam's law is currently being challenged in the
federal courts.3 83
At the time Hodgson was handed down, Louisiana was scheduled
to vote on a bill that also prohibited most abortions.384 The proposed
law passed in the state legislature, but Louisiana's governor, Buddy
Roemer, though a recognized prolife backer, vetoed the bill because
it made no exceptions for cases of rape or incest.385 Although the
Louisiana State Senate attempted to override the veto, it failed on
two successive attempts.3 8 6
In response to all of the legislative activity among the states seek-
ing to increase their regulatory powers over the abortion decision,
members of the federal Congress proposed a bill that would effec-
tively codify the ruling in Roe v. Wade and prevent further state lim-
itations upon abortion.387 Often referred to as the "Freedom of
Choice Act of 1989," the bill was not expected to pass, especially con-
sidering President Bush's veto power.38 8 However, the fact that the
bill was introduced and considered illustrates the fact that Congress
may eventually play some role in the tug-of-war between the states
and the Supreme Court.389
378. Whitman, The New Power of Labels in the Abortion Wars, U.S. News and
World Rep., July 9, 1990, at 20. Public polls showed that Americans generally opposed
abortion for birth control purposes. Id.
379. Id. It is interesting to note that these proposed laws basically conformed to the
types of laws in effect in many states immediately preceding Roe. See supra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
380. San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1990, at A12.
381. Id. See also U.S.A. Today, June 26, 1990, at 3A.
382. San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1990, at A12.
383. Id.
384. L.A. Times, July 8, 1990, at Al.
385. Id.
386. L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 1990, at A26, col. 1. Idaho experienced a similar scenario.
See Whitman, supra note 378, at 20.
387. Wash. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at A6.
388. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 191-92.
389. Id. at 192.
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C. Social Impact
It is important to note that a substantial percentage of pregnant
minors voluntarily consult with a parent regardless of state laws re-
quiring notification.39 0 The resulting question to be answered, then,
is why these laws are necessary, and what positive or negative effects
have they had upon minors. Prochoice advocates claim that parental
notice and consent laws work more to prohibit abortions than to pro-
mote beneficial family communication. 39 ' Hence, they maintain that
the statutes serve only a state's illegitimate purpose of placing obsta-
cles in the path of women who have a right to abortion under Roe
and its progeny.3 92 Prolife advocates, however, herald the states' in-
terests in protecting the welfare of their resident minors and allege
that the statutes work to advance these interests.393
There is little doubt that teenage pregnancy is a societal problem
which must be confronted. The teenage pregnancy rate in the United
States is the highest of all industrialized nations.3 9 4 Statistics show
that ten percent of girls aged fifteen to eighteen become pregnant,
and forty-percent of minors terminate their pregnancies through
390. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra note 292, at 287-90 (noting that 38% of all mi-
nors choose to notify their parents). Additionally, the district court in Hodgson found
that 20 to 25% of minors were accompanied by a parent at the judicial bypass proceed-
ings or had previously conferred with a parent. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp.
756, 764 (D. Minn. 1986).
391. Facts on File, World News Digest, June 29, 1990, at F3; see also Hodgson, 648 F.
Supp. at 764 (noting that "[t]he emotional trauma... tends to interfere with the par-
ent-child communication").
392. See, e.g., Note, H. 319: Ohio Adopts an Abortion Notification Statute, 12 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 205, 240 (1986) (asserting that the true purpose of Ohio's notice stat-
ute is to discourage minors from obtaining an abortion); Carlson, Abortion's Hardest
Cases, TIME, July 9, 1990, at 22, 24 (citing a study conducted after the Minnesota law
went into effect which indicated that the birthrate of minors subjected to the statute
rose 38.4% while the birthrate for eighteen to nineteen year olds, who were not cov-
ered by the statute, rose only 0.3%).
Some prolife advocates candidly admit that parental notice and consent statutes
"provide a significant opportunity to reduce the incidence of abortion." Rosenblum &
Marzen, supra note 370, at 203 (published by the Americans United for Life Legal De-
fense Fund).
393. They find support for their position in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979)
(remarking that "[t]he State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement
in important decisions by minors"). One writer remarked, "Pregnant adolescents are
by definition incapable of making mature abortion decisions. Parental notice of an in-
tent to abort is indispensable to mature judgment." Fein, Blinking Yellow Light...
From a Cautious Court, Wash. Times, July 3, 1990, at F3.
394. Boston Globe, June 26, 1990, at 1.
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abortion.39 5 Additionally, minors undergoing abortions account for
twelve percent of the 1.5 million abortions performed every year in
the United States. 396 While parental notification and consent stat-
utes may appear to provide an avenue for promoting family commu-
nication at this traumatic time in a minor's life, actual experience in
the states shows that this objective is not achieved in practice.3 97
These laws only make it harder for a minor to obtain an abortion
which may be in her best interests.39 8
The fact that early abortion is safer than childbirth has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.3 99 Therefore, regulations which limit
access to abortions and increase the time involved in obtaining them
cause the affected minor to incur risks to her health and, possibly,
her life.400 Further, some minors would rather seek out illegal abor-
tions than comply with the strictures of their state statutes.40 ' The
saddest cases involve minors who would rather resort to suicide than
notify their parents.402
Statutorily-induced family communication, when it happens, can
395. Id.
396. Newsday, June 26, 1990, at 4.
397. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
398. Both studies and actual experience show that mandatory parental involvement
statutes deter and delay teenagers from seeking medical help. In a study of unmarried
teenage abortion patients, approximately one-quarter of those surveyed said that they
would not come to an abortion clinic if parental notification was required. Torres, For-
rest & Eisman, supra note 292, at 288. Furthermore, after the notification law in Min-
nesota went into effect, the number of minors' abortions decreased by almost 33%.
Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized
Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 266 (Nov./Dec. 1983).
399. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149, 163 (1973); Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11 (1983).
400. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 750, 764-65 (D. Minn. 1986). Osofsky &
Osofsky, supra note 294, at 29. Teenagers face a much higher mortality and morbidity
risk than do older women, evidenced by the fact that maternal death for minors under
age fifteen is two-and-a-half times the rate for mothers aged twenty to twenty-four.
Id. Further, minors are much more likely to suffer from toxemia, anemia and compli-
cations from premature birth than are their older counterparts. Id.
401. Hewitt, Freeman, Nelson & Shaw, supra note 3, at 31. Dr. Hodgson, a plaintiff
in the Hodgson case, testified before the district court that one fourteen-year-old, who
wanted to keep her pregnancy secret, inserted a metal object into her vagina, causing
herself significant internal injuries. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2954 n.3 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). When this home method failed, she went to an
abortion clinic, where the doctors were forced to perform a hysterotomy. Id. There-
fore, if the young girl wishes to have children in the future, she can only do so by
Cesarean section. Id.
Other minors simply go out of state to obtain an abortion. L. TRIBE, supra note 17,
at 209. For example, after a consent law went into effect in Massachusetts, the
number of Massachusetts minors seeking abortions in Maine rose from zero, before the
statute was enacted, to 219, six years later. Id.
402. See Teicher, A Solution to the Chronic Problem of Living: Adolescent At-
tempted Suicide, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 129, 136 (J. Schoolar
ed. 1973) (study showing that approximately one-fourth of minor women who attempt
suicide do so because they believe they are pregnant).
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result in extremely devastating, rather than beneficial effects. Many
minors are faced with the wrath of abusive or violent parents.403 In
other families, where daughters feel free to discuss their predicament
with one or both parents, the notification and consent laws are
plainly unnecessary.
Finally, while supporters of these laws point to the fact that judi-
cial alternatives are available for minors who do not wish to notify
their parents, these bypass procedures have also been found to cause
great anxiety for minors and delay of their abortions.404 Further-
more, the medical professionals involved are probably better quali-
fied to determine the minor's maturity and best interests than any
judge.40 5
In light of these statistics and findings, it is apparent that the en-
actment of these parental involvement laws may not be the best
method for dealing with this country's teenage pregnancy problem or
for supporting the family unit. A better method would certainly be
achieved if the states with these laws relented and allowed minors'
decisions to abort to be protected by the same privacy interests recog-
nized for adult women.40 6 Alternatively, they could follow the lead
of states such as Connecticut and Wisconsin, where the abortion prac-
titioner is required to encourage minors to notify a parent, but where
the final decision regarding notification rests with the minor.40 7 In
fact, one physician who testified in the Hodgson case indicated that
minors may be the best judges of their parents' reactions upon notifi-
cation of their pregnancies.408
Thus, as Laurence Tribe has said, "parental consent and notice re-
quirements may sound like moderate recognitions of the parents'
central role in family lite but are likely in practice to achieve little
403. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 768 (noting that many Minnesota minors are vic-
tims of "rape, incest, neglect and violence" from family members). A graphic example
is the case of a 13 year old minor in Idaho who became pregnant by her own father.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 203. After he was notified of this fact, he shot and
killed her with a rifle. Id.
404. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2940 n. 29.
405. See Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's Maturity, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 90 (1985) (arguing against the propriety of judicial bypass procedures).
See also, Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2959 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (remarking on the lack of judicial expertise on the subject of minors' abortions).
406. During the first trimester of pregnancy, an adult woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy is made solely by the woman and her physician. Roe, 410 U.S. at
163.
407. See 1990 Conn. Acts 113 (Reg. Sess.); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.78(5) (West 1989).
408. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2953 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing the testimony of Dr. Elissa Benedek).
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and to cause great grief.'"409
V. CONCLUSION
The Hodgson v. Minnesota decision appears harmless enough on
the surface. After all, doesn't it simply allow parental involvement
at a critical moment in a minor's life? A look at the political forces
on each side of the issue in that case has revealed that its ramifica-
tions are much farther reaching than a first glance would indicate.
When Roe was decided in 1973, the law on abortion seemed to be set
against state regulation. However, the seventeen years since Roe
have shown a progression, slow at first, and then gaining significant
momentum through the Reagan years, of ever-increasing state regu-
lation. What's more, the very law at issue in Hodgson does not ap-
pear to foster any legitimate state interest, but only provides an
obstacle to the exercise of the very right first recognized in Roe v.
Wade. Hence, it seems that the current prolife strategy of chipping
away at Roe, slowly enough to avoid public offense, but consistently
enough to achieve the ultimate goal,410 is achieving some success with
the cooperation of the Supreme Court.
If a majority of the court is bent on overturning Roe, it seems that
they should come forward and do it. Obviously, the Bush administra-
tion would support that action, and uncertainty in an area of the law
so personal and with such far-reaching effects can only produce un-
necessary tension, anxiety. and litigation. If the Court continues on
its current progression of disassembling the "constitutionalized man-
sion of abortion law.., door jamb by door jamb,"411 it seems that the
Court has avoided fulfilling a duty owed to the public: to provide gui-
dance and explanation regarding the extent of constitutional protec-
tions available in this nation.412 If the issue is to be returned to the
political processes, then the Court should let it go.4 13
Before Roe slips out the back door of the courthouse, some parting
words might be appropriate. Justice Blackmun's foresight of this
current constitutional dilemma was apparent in the concluding words
409. L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 203.
410. See supra note 336.
411. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
412. Justice Scalia blasted the majority's refusal to reconsider Roe when confronted
with Webster, saying, "Of the four courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm
Roe, to overrule it explicitly, to overrule it sub silentio, or to avoid the question-the
last is the least responsible." Id.
413. In fact, the general counsel for the National Right to Life Committee believes
that the Court has already reversed Roe implicitly through its Webster decision.
DeBenedictis, Two Abortion Laws Struck Down, A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (Nov/Dec 1990). He
accused the Court of failing to expressly reveal its intentions and said, "I think that's a
duty that they have." Id.
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to his dissenting opinion in Webster. He warned the Court of the
ramifications which would inevitably flow from its vague opinion
that day by saying, "[Flor today, at least, the law of abortion stands
undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the lib-
erty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very om-
inous, and a chill wind blows."414
VI. EPILOGUE
In its 1990 term, the Supreme Court will face one challenge to the
status of permissible governmental regulation of abortion. Re-
cently enacted regulations affecting federally funded clinics prohibit
counselors from informing their low-income patients of the availabil-
ity of abortion as a family planning technique.4i5 The issues, no
doubt, include the rights to abortion as well as free speech.4 16 Once
again, the Bush administration has called for a reversal of Roe
through the decision on this case.4 17 The ruling, expected in 1991,
may at least shed some light on Justice Souter's inclinations on the
abortion issue.
Additionally, it is expected in the near future that the Court will
be confronted with challenges to laws enacted in Pennsylvania and
Guam. These laws are currently considered the nation's strictest
anti-abortion laws.418 Since Guam's law criminalizes abortion except
when two independent doctors agree that the mother's life or health
is seriously endangered, it is the most factually similar case to Roe
that the Court could possibly consider in the short term.4 19 Both
laws have already been struck down in their respective district
courts4 20 and are currently in the appeals process.42 1 Therefore,
414. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
415. Peck & Williams, Supreme Court Preview: The "A" Word, A.B.A. J. 54 (Nov./
Dec. 1990). It would be illegal under the new regulations, for example, to show a pa-
tient a listing of abortion practitioners in the Yellow pages. L.A. Times, May 30, 1990,
at Al, col. 1.
416. L.A. Times, May 30, 1990, at Al, col. 1. Prochoice advocates hope the Court
will strike down the regulations as violations of the first amendment and, thereby,
avoid any significant decision on the abortion issue. U.S.A. Today, May 30, 1990, at 3A.
417. DeBendictis, supra note 413, at 20. The administration argued in its brief filed
by the Justice Department that there is no fundamental right to abortion in the " 'text,
structure, or history of the Constitution.'" Id
418. Id.
419. Id The Pennsylvania law, while imposing stiff restrictions on abortion, does
not ban abortion outright. Id. at 21.
420. Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at Al.
421. DeBenedictis, supra note 413, at 21.
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although the Court has successfully side-stepped addressing Roe di-




422. See supra notes 333-44 and 361 and accompanying text.
423. Janet Benshoof, director of the reproductive freedom project of the American
Civil Liberties Union, asserts that "[t]here is no question that the Guam law and Roe
vs. Wade are incompatible." L.A. Daily News, September 22, 1990, at 16, col. 1.
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